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I.

INTRODUCTION

Much of the Anglo-American law of land is explicable only in the
light of man's search for title security. No great problem with chattels,
since possession normally indicates ownership ... [but] assured own-

ership of the vendor still plagues the real property lawyer.'
Man's search for title security in real estate has long been conducted in a
climate of warm hospitality in Florida. Land transactions are a key ingredient
of the state's economic vitality. The legislature has passed many laws aimed
at improving the reliability of the vast array of recorded documents affecting
property ownership, commonly referred to as "the record.''2 Ideally, the record
should reveal quickly and clearly who owns each and every square foot of land
in Florida.
This ideal, however, has not and cannot be realized. Since the emergence
of dower as a means of protecting a dead landowner's family, policy considerations have moved both courts and legislatures to recognize the validity of
certain property interests not appearing of record. Today, courts generally hold
homestead rights and rights of persons in possession, two interests which are
not on the record, to be of sufficiently great societal benefit to trump adverse
interests in property that appear, from a search of the record, to be invulnerable.

1. J. CRIBBErr, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 263 (2d ed. 1975).
2. A significant example of legislative attempts to improve record reliability is thc passage
of the Marketable Record Title Act in 1963, ch. 63-133, 1963 Fla. Laws 257 (codified at FA.

STAT. SS 712.01-.10 (1985)).
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Title searchers grumble as additional, non-record categories emerge. Their job
becomes more difficult because they must now look beyond the record to extrinsic circumstances, if they are to insure marketable title.
A recent decision of the Florida Supreme Court, Coastal Petroleum Co. v.
American Cyanamid Co.,s radically expands the universe of protected, non-record
real property interests. Coastal holds that facially absolute deeds issued by the
government to the public in the nineteenth century failed to divest the state
of its title to "sovereignty lands." '4 The supreme court found the strong public
interest in maintaining public ownership and use of rivers and lakes to outweigh
the interest in title security. The State of Florida, therefore, has title to sovereignty lands, even those lying within the legal description of and purportedly
conveyed by earlier, validly executed deeds. Thus, the record may show title
to these lands vested in X, a private deedholder, while in reality, title is in
the state.
Florida now confronts the task of identifying these sovereignty lands. The
formula for identification is easily stated: sovereignty lands are those lying beneath waters which were navigable on March 3, 1845, 5 and the line separating
6
them from privately-owned uplands is the ordinary high water line.
This article suggests that application of the apparently simple formula will
involve factually intensive disputes of inordinate complexity. A sharp distinction
should be drawn between the allegation of sovereignty and the proof of sovereignty.
Alleging that a parcel contains sovereignty lands is easy. Proximity to any
waterbody will do. Proof, on the other hand, is difficult and quite expensive.
This is true whether one is trying to prove that a parcel contains sovereignty
lands or to prove that it does not.
In theory, Coastal could trigger a flood of quiet title actions by the Department of Natural Resources (DNR)7 seeking judicial affirmation of the state's
title to some three million acres" of alleged sovereignty lands throughout the

3. 492 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1986).
4. Id. at 342. "Sovereignty lands" include those "lands beneath navigable waters, up to
the ordinary high water mark." Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 17-21. Sovereignty lands are
distinguished from other state-held property because the former "are for public use, 'not for the
purpose of sale or conversion into other values, or reduction into several or individual ownership.'
492 So. 2d at 342 (quoting State v. Gerbing, 56 Fla. 603, 608, 47 So. 353, 355 (1908)).
5. Florida was admitted to the union on this date. Act of Mar. 3, 1845, ch. 75, 5 Stat.
788, reprinted in 25 FLA. STAT. ANN. 349 (West 1970).
6. See Howard v. Ingersoll, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 379, 427 (1851) (Curtis, J., concurring);
setalso infra text accompanying notes 197-226.
7. The Division of State Lands, Department of Natural Resources, is charged with the
administration and sale of state lands. Presumably, the Division would spearhead action taken with
regard to ownership and title of state lands. The Department of Natural Resources was authorized
by the Florida Governmental Reorganization Act of 1969, ch. 69-106, S 25, 1969 Fla. Laws 491,
543 (codified at FLA. STAT. S 20.25 (1985)), and substantially modified by the Florida Environmental
Reorganization Act of 1975, ch. 75-22, 1975 Fla. Laws 42. The Division of State Lands was created
in 1979. Act of Oct. 1, 1979, ch. 79-255, § 2, 1979 Fla. Laws 1402, 1404 (codified at FLA. STAT.
S 2 0 . 2 5(2)(g) (1985)).
8. Department of Natural Resources Memorandum from Douglas A. Thompson, Assistant
Bureau Chief, to Kevin Crowley, General Counsel, entitled Miscellaneous Sovereign Land Statistics
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state. This result, however, is unlikely because an attempt by government to
simply take back ten percent of the total Florida land mass would be political
suicide.9
Instead, the sovereignty lands issue will likely be raised reactively in a wide
variety of transactions. DNR, for example, might raise it in denying a permit
to build; a purchaser might raise it in justifying his refusal to close; and a
mortgage company might raise it in justifying its refusal to fund. The predictable
outcome is that the reactor will prevail, regardless of the merits. The cost to
the actor of litigating the sovereignty lands issue will make most challenges
uneconomic, even if the actor was ultimately successful in defeating the sovereignty lands allegation. The actor will simply abandon the project or seek
some negotiated accommodation with the reactor. For those cases large enough
to merit litigation, this article argues the case-by-case outcomes will, by reason
of their factual intensity, be inconsistent from parcel to parcel. Finding no
justification for such a process of dispute resolution, the article concludes that
legislative intervention is necessary and proposes a statutory solution to the
problem.
II.

HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT IN FLORIDA LAND TITLE

The sovereignty lands controversy arises within the interstices of the larger
matrix of Florida land title history. A review of the process by which the state
acquired and subsequently transferred its title to Florida lands is necessary to
fully understand the dimensions of this controversy.
A.

Spain Cedes to the United States

On February 22, 1819, the King of Spain granted and ceded by treaty to
the United States the territories known as East and West Florida.'1 Under the
grant, the United States formally acquired fee simple title to all of the lands
in present day Florida, including submerged lands and navigable waters. The
treaty excepted those lands conveyed by prior Spanish land grants which were
"ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession . . . to the same extent

(Apr. 9, 1985) (including acreage and litigation cost computations) [hereinafter cited as DNR Cost
Memo].
9. Aside from the political considerations, a comprehensive effort would require financial
and human resources which the legislature may be unwilling to fund. After Coastal, however, the
state has the luxury of time. The "implied reservation" is perpetual, and a private claimant cannot
perfect his title except by formal adjudication. State officials thus may react to attempts to quiet
title on a parcel-by-parcel basis without incurring the political cost inherent in a more active
approach.

10. The treaty was ratified in 1821, and ceded the territory "in full property and sovereignty."
In other words, the United States received both title to the lands and the right to establish a
legitimate government over the territory. The treaty expressly included "the adjacent islands dependent on said provinces, all public lots and squares, vacant lands, public edifices, fortifications,
barracks, and other buildings, which are not private property ...." Treaty of Amity, Settlement,
and Limits, Feb. 22, 1819, United States-Spain, art. II, 8 Stat. 252, 254, T.S. No. 327 (ratified
Feb. 22, 1821), reprinted in 25 FLA.

STAT. ANN.

281, 282 (West 1970).
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that the same grants would be valid if the territories had remained under the
dominion of his Catholic Majesty." 1 1 Title to these privately held lands was inde2
pendently confirmed by Acts of Congress and written patents.
Nine days after ratification, Congress authorized the President to take possession of the territories of East and West Florida. :3 Andrew Jackson was appointed Florida's first Territorial Governor.' 4 During the territorial period only
a few 160 acre tracts were actually patented,'" one to the territorial government
6
and one tract to each of the then existing counties.
B.

Florida Becomes a State

Florida became a state on March 3, 1845. Subsequently, the federal government transferred great amounts of land to the state using four separate and
distinct techniques.
1. Sovereignty Lands
Under American jurisprudence, states hold certain lands by virtue of their
sovereignty rather than by traditional property conveyances. These lands include
those which lie either beneath tidal waters or beneath navigable waterways up
to the ordinary high water line (OHWL).' 7 When Florida became a state in
1845, it immediately and automatically succeeded to all right, title and interest
in the sovereignty lands by virtue of both the common law "equal footing" doctrine,18

11. Id. art. VIII, 8 Stat. at 258, T.S. No. 327, reprinted in 25 FLA. STAT. ANN. at 284.
12. See Act of Jan. 23, 1832, ch. 10, 4 Stat. 496; Act of May 26, 1830, ch. 106, 4 Stat.
405; Act of Feb. 8, 1827, ch. 9, 4 Stat. 202; Act of Apr. 22, 1826, ch. 29, 4 Stat. 156. The
procedures Congress authorized for establishing claims are outlined in Act of Mar. 3, 1825, ch.
83, 4 Stat. 125; Act of Mar. 3, 1823, ch. 29, 3 Stat. 754; and Act of May 8, 1822, ch. 129, 3
Stat. 709.
13. Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 93, 3 Stat. 523.
14. Instructions and Commissions for Occupation of East and West Florida, from the Secretary
of State to Major General Andrew Jackson (Mar. 12, 1821), reprinted in 25 FLA. STAT. ANN. 294
(West 1970).
15. A "patent" is a document equivalent to a private deed by which the federal government
transfers title to its lands. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONAPY 1013 (5th ed. 1979).
16. See Act of Mar. 2, 1829, ch. 39, 4 Stat. 357; Act of Feb. 8, 1827, ch. 9, 4 Stat. 202;
Act of May 24, 1924, ch. 137, 4 Stat. 30. These tracts were for use as seats of government. The
United States reserved, but did not patent, two entire townships, one in East and the other in West
Florida, for the use of "a seminary of learning." Act of Mar. 3, 1823, ch. 29, § 11, 3 Stat. 754, 756.
17. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894). Shively expresses the prevailing American view
that the sovereign owns all submerged bottoms under navigable waterways including both inland
and tidal waters. Id. at 57. In contrast, English common law provides that the riparian owners
own the beds of all fresh-water rivers above the ebb and flow of the tide regardless of navigability.
Id. at 31. Private ownership of fresh-water rivers was tempered by a "public interest, orjus publicum,
of passage and repassage." Id. at 12. The historical dimension of the sovereignty lands controversy
is thoroughly examined in Rosen, Public and Private Ownership Rights in Lands Under Navigable Waters:
The Governmental/PropritatyDistinction, 34 U. F". L. REv. 561, 564-69 (1982).
18. Although the notion that new states be admitted on an "equal footing" with prior states
was not expressly required by the Constitution, see U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, S 3, or, for Florida
specifically, by the Spanish treaty of acquisition, see supra note 10, courts have long construed an
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and the express "equal footing" language of the admission statute. 19 The equal
footing doctrine accords states admitted to the Union subsequent to the original
20
thirteen colonies equal footing with all other states.
Upon the signing of the Declaration of Independence, the original thirteen
states acquired sovereignty (and sovereignty lands) from Great Britain. The
original states retained their sovereignty (and interest in sovereignty lands) upon
admission to the United States. Since the original thirteen states retained their
sovereignty lands, the new states (including Florida) had to receive title to
sovereignty lands if they were to be on an equal footing.2' No grants or patents
were necessary to accomplish this transfer and none were issued. Thus, no
catalog or other list of sovereignty lands was made contemporaneously with
statehood. This lack of a certain property description gives rise to the modern
sovereignty lands controversy.
2.

Government, Education and Section Sixteen Lands

By a separate act, passed on the day of Florida's statehood, the United
States granted to the state
eight entire sections of land for purpose of fixing their seat of Government; also section number sixteen in every township . .
. for the
support of public schools; also, two entire townships of land, in addition
to the two townships already reserved, for the use of two seminaries of
learning - one to be located east, and the other west of the Suwannee
22
river ....
"equal footing" requirement for all new states. See Escanaba & Lake Mich. Transp. Co. v. City

of Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 688-89 (1883) (once admitted to the union, Illinois was on an equal
footing with the original states and could exercise the same power over navigable waters as the
original states); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 228-30 (1845) (Alabama succeeded to
the same sovereignty and jursidiction over nagivable waters and the soils underneath them as the
original states); see also Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 573 (1910) (once admitted to the Union,
states become entitled to equal rights of dominion and sovereignty as those enjoyed by the original
states).
The plain deduction from this case is that when a new state is admitted into the Union,
it is so admitted with all of the powers of sovereignty and jurisdiction which pertain to
the original states, and that such powers may not be constitutionally diminished, impaired,
or shorn away ....
Coyle, 221 U.S. at 573; see Mayor of Mobile v. Eslava, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 234, 253-54 (1842)
(Catron, J., concurring) (Alabama admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original
states, and as a result retains sovereignty over the lands beneath navigable tidal waters from the
low to high water mark).
19. The admission statute provided:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That the States of Iowa and Florida be, and the same
are hereby, declared to be States of the United States of America, and are hereby admitted
into the Union on equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatsoever.
Act of Mar. 3, 1845, ch. 48, S 1, 5 Stat. 742, 742 (emphasis added).

20. See supra note 18.
21. Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 583 (1922); Pollard v. Hagen, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
212, 228-29 (1845); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842).

22. Act of Mar. 3, 1845, ch. 75, S 1, 5 Stat. 788, 788 (supplementing the act for the
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The lands referred to for "fixing their seat of Government" were not lands
in and about Tallahassee but were eight sections in Columbia County2' to be
sold to provide funds for the construction of a suitable state capitol.2 4 The
University of Florida (Gainesville) and Florida State University (Tallahassee)
are the successors of the "two seminaries of learning - one to be located east,
and the other west of the Suwannee river.' 5
3.

Internal Improvement Lands

In 1841 Congress passed a statute which granted each state subsequently
admitted to the Union five hundred thousand acres of land for purposes of
internal improvement. ", This one-half million acres was to take into account
lands granted to the territorial government, 7 but would exclude sovereignty
lands and lands granted for governmental and educational purposes.2 1
4. Swamp and Overflowed Lands
Two-thirds of the land area of Florida was ultimately transferred to the state
pursuant to the 1850 Federal Swamp and Overflowed Lands Act. 2 " The act

admission of Florida and Iowa into the Union). The "two townships already reserved" refers to
those reserved to the Territory in 1823. See supra note 16.
No separate patent was required to pass title to these lands. The filing and approval of the
lists of selections by surveyed descriptions perfected title. In areas where section sixteen lands had
previously been conveyed or were fractional sections, other lands were granted to make up the
deficiency. See Act of Feb. 28, 1891, ch. 384, 26 Stat. 796 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §5
851-852 (1982)); Act of Feb. 26, 1859, ch. 58, 11 Stat. 385.
23. 3 FLA. STAT. 231 (1941) [hereinafter cited as Whitfield's Notes]. Volume III of the 1941
Florida Statutes contains a summary of many legal and historical documents related to Florida compiled by James Bryan Whitfield, a former Florida Supreme Court Justice.
24. Id.
25. Although under article XI of the 1838 Florida Constitution the General Assembly was
responsible for lands conveyed to the state, much of the section sixteen lands was improperly
conveyed by the Governor and Cabinet acting as the Board of Education. The Legislature retroactively validated these conveyances. Act of May 22, 1901, ch. 4999, S 2, 1901 Fla. Laws 149,
149 (codified at FLA. STAT. 5 694.06 (1985)).
26. Act of Sept. 4, 1841, ch. 16, S 8, 5 Stat. 453, 455.
27. Id.
28. Governmental and education lands were conveyed by a separate act four years later. Act
of Mar. 3, 1845, ch. 75, S 1, 5 Stat. 788, 788. Had such lands been included as part of the five
hundred thousand acres, the subsequent act would have been a nullity as it applied to land and
land transfers. Sovereignty lands could not count against the total because their quantity was
unknown.
29. Act of Sept. 28, 1850, ch. 84, 9 Stat. 519. The act was "to enable the State of Arkansas
to construct the necessary levees and drains to reclaim the swamp and overflowed lands therein
Id. S 1, 9 Stat. at 519. Any proceeds received by Arkansas from its resale of the land
"shall be applied, exclusively, as far as necessary, to the purpose of reclaiming said lands by means
of levees and drains." Id. S 2, 9 Stat. at 519. Almost as an afterthought, section 4 of the Act
extended the benefits of the Act to other states in which swamp and overflowed lands might be
situated. Id. S 4, 9 Star. at 520. A total of 20,438,253.17 acres was eventually patented to the
State of Florida under this Act. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, LAND & FIELD NOTE DIVISIONS,
TWENTY-THIRD

BIENNIAL REPORT

26 (1934) [hereinafter cited as
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provided that "all legal subdivisions [quarter quarter sections or government
lots], the greater part of which is 'wet and unfit for cultivation' " should be
transferred to the state. 30 The Secretary of the Interior was directed to make
an accurate list of the lands to be conveyed and, upon the request of the Governor of the state, to cause a patent for the swamp and overflowed lands ("S&O
31
lands") to be issued.
To discharge the statutory mandates, the federal government commissioned
a complete survey of the state.32 The surveyors' duty was to subdivide the state
into a grid starting from imaginary north-south and east-west axes intersecting
in Tallahassee. The surveyors divided the land into townships, squares of land
six miles by six miles. The townships were then subdivided into 36 one mile
square sections. As they traveled about the state surveying the lands, the surveyors kept detailed field notes indicating swamps, streams, and rivers, and the
width of waterbodies at the point they crossed section lines. These field notes
were compiled into a series of very detailed township maps, which reflected the
checkerboarding of each township into sections and the location of small streams,
ponds, trails, cultivated fields, and towns. " The surveying process was conducted with such precision that sections and parts of sections were measured
to the nearest 1/100th of an acre."
When the federal surveyors encountered navigable waters, the survey process
and checkerboarding procedure were modified. First, the surveyor would compute a description of the line along the edge of the water, the meander line.
The meander line was shown on the map itself and formally described in the
marginal notes. Second, the surveyor would complete the section by laying out
and describing a series of fractional sections or government lots, each measured
to the nearest 1/100th of an acre."3
Contemporaneously with the federal survey, the General Assembly, pursuant
to its constitutional authority,', delegated responsibility for the S&O lands to

30. Act of Sept. 28, 1850, ch. 84, 5 3, 9 Stat. 519, 519. Section 1 of the Act describes
these lands as "swamp and overflowed lands . . . made unfit thereby for cultivation." Id. S 1,
9 Stat. at 519.
31. Id. 5 2, 9 Stat. at 519.
32. Act of May 24, 1824, ch. 137, S 4, 4 Stat. 30, 31; Act of Mar. 3, 1823, ch. 29, S 7,
3 Stat. 754, 755. The methodology to be employed in federal surveys is set forth in U.S. REv'D
STAT. S 2395 (1898). See Off. of Surveyor General, General Instructions to Deputy Surveyors (Nov.
3, 1842), reprinted in, C. WHITE, A HIsroRY OF THE RECTANoULAR SURVEY SYSTEM 321-28 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as C. WHITE].
33. These field notes and township maps are on file with the Department of Natural Resources
in Tallahassee.
34. Given the inhospitable terrain and the state of measuring technology in the nineteenth
century, some surveying errors inevitably resulted. With the advent of improved technology, the
various "long," "short," and "kinked" sections were identified. However, the existing topography
is surprisingly close to the original surveys. See infta note 53.
35. This is seen clearly in Township 38 S., Range 23 E., where the meander line on the
Peace River (called Peace Creek on the 1855 Township map) stops. North of the meander line,
the sectioning follows a strict checkerboarding pattern. South of the line, government lots abut the
river; the sectioning begins only well upland.
36. FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. XI.
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the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund (which consisted of the Governor
and Cabinet).' Because of the state's obvious self interests, the Trustees were
concerned both with the accuracy and diligence of the surveyors and, perhaps
more importantly, with maximizing the area which would be designated swamp
and overflowed and patented to the state.
To achieve this end, the Trustees entered into contracts with at least six
agents. " These agents were employed to "select" lands and convince the Secretary of the Interior that the "greater part" of these lands was "wet and unfit
for cultivation" and thus should be patented to the state."' The agents were
paid with conveyances of land, based on the number of acres they caused to
4
be patented to the state. "
The acumen of these land agents was evidenced by the Secretary of the
Interior's designation of virtually all of peninsular Florida as being the "greater
part . . . 'wet and unfit for cultivation,' 141 despite the fact that most of the
state lying north of the Everglades had been sectioned by federal surveyors,
whose township maps and field notes indicated a considerably drier land mass.
In the final analysis, over 20 million acres were patented to Florida as S&O
4

lands.

1

C. "The State of Florida Sells the Land
In order to generate revenue, get the land on the tax rolls, and stimulate
reclamation, 4' the Trustees began selling off the S&O and Internal Improvement
lands on a per acre basis. 44 The early deeds expressly recite a consideration of

37. FLA. STAT. ch. 610 (1854-1860) (current version at FLA. STAT. SS 253.001-.83 (1985)).
38. BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 29, at 26-29. These agents received large tracts of land in
payment for their services:
Sydney I. Wailes
John A. Henderson
Wells & Randolph
Williams & Swann
Williams, Swann & Corley
L.G. Dennis
S.W. Teague

224,562.80
164,124.68
100,000.00
44,318.25
28,706.17
5,800.27
5,778.37

acres
acres
acres
acres
acres
acres
acres

Id.
39. Act of Sept. 28, 1850, ch. 84, SS 2-3, 9 Stat. 519, 519.
40. See supra note 38.
41. Act of Sept. 28, 1850, ch. 84, $ 3, 9 Stat. 519, 519.
42. See supra note 29.
43. Arguably, the federal patents under the Act granted a fee simple determinable to the
state, imposing on the state an affirmative duty of reclamation under possibility of reverter to the
federal government. See supra note 29.
44. There was a series of sales involving large tracts of land which did not fit this pattern.
In 1854, the legislature authorized the Trustees to pledge the Internal Improvement Fund assets
to guarantee the interest on bonds issued by certain railroad companies. See FI". STAT. ch. 610
(1854-1860). Guarantees were made; due to the depressed conditions in the wake of the Civil War,
the bonds went into default. The Trustees foreclosed on the railroad assets and began repurchasing
and retiring outstanding bonds. In some cases the Trustees acquired the bonds in exchange for
land. For example, transfers of land were made to E.N. Dickerson in 1867 and Win. E. Jackson
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so much per acre and describe the property conveyed in terms of sections, or
parts of a section, with the total land conveyed computed and described to the
nearest 1/100th of an acre. That acreage multiplied by the going price per acre
was the amount paid by the purchaser.
These original deeds show a clear going rate for land. The going rate was
5
ninety cents to one dollar per acre in the 1870's, rising to about two dollars
4
per acre in the early 1900's. ' In the late 1910's, when the large scale land
4 7
sales came to an end, the going price had risen above ten dollars per acre.
The Trustees did not adjust the descriptions or acreage totals in the deeds to
reflect lands then shown by the approved maps45 to include unmeandered rivers;

in 1868 for railroad bonds which fell due before the war. BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 29, at 26.
The cash assets of the fund were quickly depleted, and a receiver for the Internal Improvement
Fund was appointed in federal court. In 1881, the Trustees negotiated and consummated the sale
of four million acres of S&O lands to Hamilton Disston for $1 million, which would be used to
pay off the remaining bond debt and thus end the receivership. See 2 TRUSTEES OF INTERNAL
IMPROVEMENT FUND, MINUTES 280, 498 (1905) [hereinafter cited as MINUTESI; see also Whitfield's

Notes, supra note 23, at 233.
In the years after the Disston sale, the state chose a different method of encouraging the
development of transportation and canal facilities. Instead of guaranteeing transportation company
debts as had been done in the past, the legislature provided that, upon completion of segments of
a railroad or canal, the alternate (odd-numbered) sections of land within six miles on either side
of the railroad or canal were to be conveyed to the railroad or canal company. Act of Mar. 12,
1879, ch. 3166, 1879 Fla. Laws 119, 119. When there were insufficient lands lying within six
miles to constitute the requisite number of acres, the Trustees were to grant enough alternate
sections lying within twenty miles of the railroad or canal to make up any shortfall. Id. This
authority had been specifically reserved to the legislature in FLA. STAT. ch. 610, S 29 (1854-1860),
which granted general authority over state lands to the Trustees. By July 1, 1934, 9,070,156.56
acres had been deeded to railroads for internal improvement. BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 29, at
24.
In the wake of the bond default and the Disston purchase, the voters enacted a constitutional
prohibition against pledging the state's credit for the benefit of private corporations. See FLA. CONST.
of 1868, art. XII, S 8. This prohibition has survived to the present day. See FLA. CONsT. art VII,

S 10.
45. See Deed Nos. 4000 to 9074 (located in Department of Natural Resources archives). The
going rate dropped as low as 80 cents. Isolated sales occurred at $3 per acre, presumably for
particularly desirable land. See, e.g., Deed No. 7963 (Mar. 17, 1877) (conveying 40 acres for $3
per acre). The Disston Deed, see supra note 44, sold 4 million acres for 25 cents per acre. See 2
MINUTES, supra note 44, at 280, 498.
46. See, e.g., Deed No. 15,900. At about this time, the Trustees changed the Standard Form

of the Trustees' Deed (1) to add an express reservation to enter and erect canals, cuts, sluices,
and dikes, to facilitate the "drainage and reclamation" of the conveyed properties, and (2) to

reserve expressly a profit i prendre in gravel needed for dikes. See 6
82.

MINUTES,

supra note 44, at

47. In the 1910's, prices were less stable. The per acre charge varied from an average low
of about $5 per acre, see, e.g., Deed No. 16,726, to an average high of $100 per acre, see, e.g.,
Deed No. 16,777 (conveying 40 acres in Palm Beach to F.L. Tatum for $4,000).
48. The Trustees relied on the surveys and detailed maps prepared by the federal surveyors
and used these descriptions when conveying the property to private landowners. See supra note 32
and accompanying text. The 1842 instructions to the Florida Surveyors stressed the importance of
accurate meandering work. C. WHITE, supra note 32, at 326.
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nor did the Trustees reserve any interests in the land lying beneath small ponds
4
or streams. "

Conveyances of land abutting meandered waters were treated differently.
'
The property was described as either a fractional section or government lot,"
or by a metes and bounds description expressly referring to and excluding the
water body."' A purchaser receiving such property stood in a different position
from one receiving a section or smaller piece of a section. First, he paid the
going rate per acre only for the number of acres actually contained in the

purchased lot; "[m]ost settlers would not buy land containing a lake, thereby
paying $1.25 per acre for areas they could not farm."' 2 Second, he took title
with actual notice that the land abutted navigable waters. "
III.

THE MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE
SOVEREIGNTY LANDS PROBLEM

The sale of state lands to private owners, without mention of potentially
navigable waterways either by excluding them from the description or by an
express reservation, laid the foundation for the subsequent sovereignty lands
controversy. The next stone was set in 1963 with the passage of the Marketable
4
Record Title Act.
A.

Applying the Marketable Record Title Act to State Lands

The legislature enacted the Marketable Record Title Act (MRTA)" for the

49. The land remaining in the hands of the United States was likewise conveyed piecemeal
to individual deedholders. See U.S. REV'D STAT. SS 2209-2317 (1895) (homesteading); id. SS 23532379 (sale of public lands, also without reference to arguably navigable waters). These conveyances
are generally free of the sovereignty lands controversy because (1) most of the lands sold by the
United States, not being S&O lands, were presumably higher and farther from water, and (2) the
federal government had no claim to sovereignty lands, thus the estoppel and contemporaneous
determination arguments discussed below are inapplicable. See infra text accompanying notes 74-78.
50. "Fractional section" refers to a section of land, a portion of which is covered by navigable
waters. U.S. REv'o STAT. S 2407 (1898). Government lots were described and delineated on the
official township plat and identified by lot number. See generally C. WHITE, supra note 32, at 82127.
51. See Patent No. 137 (the Everglades Patent), reported in Everglades Sugar & Land Co. v.
Bryan, 81 Fla. 75, 94-95, 87 So. 68, 73-74 (1921); see also Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 55458, 112 So. 274, 280-81 (1927) (detailing conveyance to Col. Henderson).
52. C. WHtTE, supra note 32, at 82.
53. Not all government lots abutted navigable waters. Often the sections bordering the north
and west edges of a township (Sections I through 6, and Sections 7, 18, 19, 30 and 31) will
contain a series of government lots largely because the township measured out either "long" (that
is, as originally laid out the township was more than one mile on a side, thus containing too much
acreage) or "short" (including less than one mile on a side). In other cases, the official survey did
not reflect the problem, and years passed before a subsequent surveyor determined the section was
or even "kinked." Act of May 24, 1824, ch. 141, 4 Stat. 34.
"long," "short,"
54. Marketable Record Title Act, ch. 63-133, 1963 Fla. Laws 257 (codified at FLA. STAT.
SS 712.01-.10 (1985)).
55. For an excellent review of the passage of the Marketable Record Tide Act, see Powell,
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express purpose of "simplifying and facilitating land title transactions by allowing persons to rely on a record title."'' " The goal was to reduce the need
to examine a century or more of title records and to cure many of the all too
common conveyancing and scrivener's errors which had accumulated over the
years. Before MRTA, an exhaustive title examination and error-correcting process were necessary incidents of any substantial property transaction. Prior legislation had addressed these problems piecemeal. 7 Due to their limited scope,
these earlier legislative efforts were only partially effective. MRTA's purpose
was to provide a self-effectuating and comprehensive corrective system.
Three elements must be shown to perfect title under MRTA: (1) an owner
must have the legal capacity to own land; "8 (2) an owner must be able to show
a "title transaction" purporting to create or transfer the estate claimed;"" and
(3) the title transaction apparently vesting the claimed interest in an owner or
predecessor in title must have appeared of record for 30 years." If an owner
can show each of these elements, all title transactions, acts, and claims predating
the 30 year period (subject to certain exceptions)r2 are "declared to be null and
void ' " 2 and the owner is declared to have "a marketable record title.""
Although the exceptions to MRTA are significant, they do not swallow the

Unfinished Business - Protecting Public Rights to State Lands from Being Lost Under Florida's Marketable
Record 7Ytle Act, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 599, 600-05 (1985).
56. MRTA, ch. 63-133, S 10, 1963 Fla. Laws 257, 262 (codifed at FLA. STAT. S 712.10

(1985)).
57. The legislature has passed several curative acts to reduce the need for quitclaim deeds
from distant heirs of past owners and quiet title actions. Such acts included legislative validation
of certain conveyances by married women, see FLA. STAT. SS 694.03-.04 (1985); by the Board of
Education during periods they lacked authority, see id. 5 694.06; by any party where witnesses,
validation, seals, or acknowledgments were lacking, see id. 5 694.08; and by any party where the
names of corporate parties were misspelled or misstated, but their identities were obvious from the
instrument, see id. S 694.12.
58.

FLA.

STAT.

S

712.02(1) (1985).

59. Id. MRTA defines "title transaction" as "any recorded instrument or court proceeding
which affects title to any estate or interest in land and which describes the land sufficiently to identify
its location and boundaries." Id. S 712.01(3) (emphasis added). This definition embodies two separate
concepts. First, the claimant must show some writing recorded in the public records. It need not
be in the nature of a traditional deed or conveyance; the writing need only be a facially effective
conveyance of the claimed interest. Courts have liberally defined the scope of "title transaction"
and what "affects title." See, e.g., Marshall v. Hollywood, Inc., 224 So. 2d 743, 749 (4th D.C.A.
1969) (word "affecting" in MRTA does not carry narrow meaning of "changing or altering,"
but rather carries broader meaning of "concerning or producing an effect upon"), aff'd, 236 So.
2d 114 (Fla.), cert. dmied, 400 U.S. 964 (1970). Second, the definition of title transaction contemplates a specific legal description, presumably one sufficiently definite to convey legal title.
60. FLA. STAT. S 712.02(1) (1985). The thirty-year-old title transaction is known as the "root
of title." The effective date of the root of title is the date of recording. Id. S 712.01(2); see also
id. 5 695.11 (instruments conveying interests in real estate deemed recorded from time of filing).
61. See id. S 712.02(2) (MRTA not applicable to actions filed prior to Oct. 1, 1986, to quiet
title to sovereignty lands, lands granted for school purposes, and section sixteen lands); id. S 712.03
(listing exceptions to marketability).
62. Id. S 712.04.
63. Id. S 712.02(1).
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rule. 64 As originally proposed, MRTA would have expressly excluded all state
lands from its applicability, but during the deliberative process the exclusion
was omitted. "' For purposes of MRTA, "person" was defined to include parties,
"private or governmental, including the state and any political subdivision or
agency thereof." ' ' The apparent applicability of MRTA to the state is reinforced
by MRTA's declaration that affected interests shall be void "whether such
estates . . . are or appear to be held or asserted by a person . . . private or
governmental . . . except . . . any right, title, or interest of the United States,
Florida or any of its officers, boards, commissions or other agencies reserved in
the patent or deed by which the United States, Florida, or any of its agencies parted with
title.""'' Thus, as originally passed in 1963, MRTA was on its face applicable
to state lands, unless an interest was expressly reserved in the original patent
or deed. '
B.

Impact of Pre-Coastal Cases

The potential application of MRTA to sovereignty lands was not widely
recognized until the Florida Supreme Court addressed the issue in Odom v.
Deltona Corp." in 1976. Lower courts read the Odom decision as a determination
that MRTA would confirm sovereignty lands in the hands of deedholders.7"
Odom, like many subsequent cases, involved two claimants to the same parcel
of land. The first claimant (the deedholder) showed a chain of title back to the

64.

The original exceptions to the applicability of MRTA were:
A. Defects and reservations revealed in the root of title. Id. 9 712.03(1).
B. Claims preserved by the filing of notice within the thirty-year period. Id. § 712.03(2).
C. Rights of persons in possession of the land, for as long as that person remains in possession. Id. S 712.03(3).
D. Estates, interests and claims arising out of title transactions within the thirty-year period.
Id. S 712.03(4).
E. Recorded or unrecorded easements of servitudes which are at least partially in use. Id.
S 712.03(5).
F. Rights of any person in whose name the land is assessed for tax purposes. This protection is preserved for three years after the land is last assessed to the person. Id. S 712.03(6).
G. Interests reserved in the patent or deed by which the United States, Florida, or any
of its agencies parted with tide. Id. S 712.04.
65. Powell, supra note 55, at 612.
66. FLA. STAT. S 712.01(l) (1985).
67. Id. S 712.04 (emphasis added).
68. Bul see Powell, supra note 55, at 612-14 (suggesting that, in light of the evidence supporting
a contrary legislative intent, the "strict construction against the state was extraordinary").
69. 341 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1976). Prior to Odom, the issue had been raised in the Fourth
District Court of Appeal between two private litigants. See Sawyer v. Modrall, 286 So. 2d 610,
612-13 (4th D.C.A. 1973) (MRTA quiets title to state agency's grant of submerged lands), cert.
denied, 297 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1974).
70. See State v. Contemporary Land Sales, Inc., 400 So. 2d 488, 492 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1981)
(MRTA perfects title in a private owner to lands which would otherwise be owned by the state
as sovereign); City of Miami v. St. Joe Paper Co., 347 So. 2d 622, 625 (3d D.C.A. 1977) (MRTA
precludes city's claim to certain lands submerged under navigable waters), aff'd, 364 So. 2d 439
(Fla. 1978); see also Starnes v. Marcon Inv. Group, 571 F.2d 1369, 1370 (5th Cir. 1978) (state
claim to sovereignty lands extinguished under MRTA).
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Trustees. The deedholder argued that the original deed was clear. The Trustees
conveyed and the predecessor in interest had paid for every acre in the parcel
at issue. Thus, the deedholder concluded that he owned the land, free and
clear, because he could trace his title back to the Trustees' deed and had paid
taxes on the land for years.
The second claimant (the sovereignty claimant) raised the sovereignty lands
issue in defense. The sovereignty claimant alleged that the Trustees' conveyance
contained a tacit or implied reservation of sovereignty lands. Thus, although
the deed was absolute on its face, the Trustees had retained title to sovereignty
lands. Moreover, prior to 1919, the Trustees lacked authority to sell sovereignty
lands.7"
C.

Disposing of the Sovereignty Lands Claim Without Trial

In cases litigated before Coastal,72 courts faced with these conflicting claims
consistently found ways to rule without addressing the fact-intensive questions
of historic navigability and the landward extent of the waterbody. 7 1 In Odom
and the cases which followed, the courts set forth three separate rules of law,
74
each independently determinative of the sovereignty lands issue.
1.

Contemporaneous Finding

Courts deemed the factual issue of navigability to have been considered and
decided by the executive branch of government when the Trustees delivered

71. Act of June 5, 1913, ch. 6451, 1913 Fla. Laws 122. The original conveyances were
generally drawn with great deliberation. The nineteenth century Trustees clearly knew how to write
in express reservations of sovereignty claims; they had developed a refined vocabulary for just this
purpose, and used it on numerous occasions, both to reserve mineral interests (by express reservation) and sovereignty interests (by exclusion).
72. E.g., Odom v. Deltona Corp., 341 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1976); Coastal Petroleum Co. v.
American Cyanamid Co., 454 So. 2d 6 (2d D.C.A. 1984), quashed, 492 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1986);
Board of Trustees v. Paradise Fruit Co., 414 So. 2d 10 (5th D.C.A. 1982), petition for review denied,
432 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1983). An exhaustive discussion is found in MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE AcT
STUDY COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS 254-55 (Feb. 15, 1986) (citing cases) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
73. The applicability of MRTA to sovereignty lands involves two questions: (1) whether on
Mar. 3, 1845, the waterbody in question was capable of supporting navigation, as defined under
the federal title test; and (2) where the OHWL would have fallen had there been no avulsive
changes in the water level over the past 140 years. Under the federal title test, navigability "is
based on the water body's potential for commercial use in its ordinary and natural conditions."
Odom, 341 So. 2d at 988.
74. See infra text accompanying notes 75-79. Some commentators are highly critical of Odom
because the issue was appealed from the trial court's summary judgment determination that the
waters in question were non-navigable. See Powell, supra note 55, at 610-12. This objection appears
to assume that the Odom court's reference to Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 112 So. 274 (1927),
amounted to an implicit determination of navigability. See also Coastal Petroleum Co. v. American
Cyanamid Co., 454 So. 2d 6 (2d D.C.A. 1984), quashed, 492 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1986). The counterargument is that the issue of navigability in 1845 could never be decided on summary judgment
because navigability is a question of fact. Thus, the only way the supreme court could properly
address and decide the issue was by applying one of the summary bases of decision. See Rosen,
supra note 17, at 603-10.
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the original deed to private landowners. In other words, the Trustees' deed
was the government's official written determination that any waterbodies con75
tained within the lands conveyed were non-navigable.
2.

Estoppel

Under the property law doctrine of legal estoppel, a grantor conveying by
warranty deed is prohibited from later denying that he had the authority to
convey the land described in the deed.7" This doctrine applies to remote grantees
on both sides of the conveyance. The courts have thus held the state is estopped
from denying that the nineteenth-century Trustees had authority to convey
submerged lands 77 even if the lands were in fact sovereignty lands by reason
76
of the navigability of the surface water.

3.

MRTA

If the landowner can show a clean patent or deed out of the sovereign, an
uninterrupted chain of ownership deriving from a recorded root of title, and
that none of the MRTA exceptions are applicable, then MRTA vests title to
the submerged lands in the record owner regardless of navigability or sover-

7
eignty. 9

In recent years the sovereignty lands controversy has been actively addressed
by the fourth estate. " The issue was often phrased in terms which were both
general and emotionally laden. Should MRTA be the basis for a land grab by
the phosphate industry or, alternatively, should the amendment of MRTA be
a pretext for a land grab by the DNR? The much narrower reality of the
controversy was lost in a cloud of misinformation and shallow analyses. MRTA
became the villain; the two other independent bases were overlooked.

75. E.g., Odom, 341 So. 2d at 984; seealso Coastal Petroleum Co. v. American Cyanamid
Co., 454 So. 2d 6, 8 (2d D.C.A. 1984), quashed, 492 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1986).
76. See Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund v. Lobean, 127 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1961). Lobean
purchased a government lot, stipulated to be submerged sovereignty lands, by Murphy Act deed
in 1946. The Trustees proposed to sell the same governmental lot to another in the late 1950's,
alleging that the 1946 deed to Lobean was void. The court held that the Trustees were legally
estopped from denying the validity of the earlier deed. Id. at 104.
Lobean was not required to prove "special and exceptional circumstances" to establish a case
of equitable estoppel against the Trustees. Id. at 101-02; see also Trustees of Internal Improvement
Fund v. Claughton, 86 So. 2d 775, 792 (Fla. 1956) (when state agency has consistently treated
owners of island as though title included submerged lands, by acquiescing in grantees' acts of
ownership, state agency is estopped from questioning title to these lands).
77. The Trustees would deny their authority to convey by claiming that the surface water
was navigable, and thus the subjacent lands were sovereignty lands not alienable by the Trustees.
78. Odom, 341 So. 2d at 977, 987-89; Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund v. Lobean,
127 So. 2d 98, 103-04 (Fla. 1961); see Rosen, supra note 17, at 596-600.
79. See Department of Natural Resources v. Bronsons, Inc., 469 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 5th D.C.A.
1985); Board of Trustees v. Paradise Fruit Co., 414 So. 2d 10 (5th D.C.A. 1982), petitionfor review
denied, 432 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1983). In both these cases MRTA was the sole summary ground used
by the court in holding for the deedholders.
80. See, e.g., MR74: Protective Plan Merits Passage, Tallahassee Democrat, Jan. 31, 1986, at
10A, col. 1.
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Inevitably the controversy focused on the legislature as the original author
of MRTA. In 1978, the legislature was called back into a special session by
the Governor to consider "legislation for the protection of the State's lands."",
During the special session, the legislature passed a bill which added a seventh
MRTA exception. Under this new exception, MRTA cannot be used to extinguish sovereignty lands claims."' Although requested to do so, the legislature
refused to address the question of retroactivity, 4 and the courts, when called
upon to interpret the effect of the exclusion, ruled that its effect was prospective
only."' The status quo ante was maintained for a number of years; only those
titles which "matured" after the 1978 amendment were affected.
The legislature also appointed a State Lands Study Committee to address
the issue."" This Committee issued its report in March, 1979.87 Subsequently,
the staff of the Senate Committee on Natural Resources and Conservation,88
and the staff of the House Committee on Natural Resourceswi presented additional reports. The legislature, however, took no further action until 1985
when it passed a bill temporarily suspending the application of MRTA to sovereignty lands and section sixteen school lands.' The bill also created a Marketable Record Title Act Study Commission to further study the issue."' This
81. Proclamation of Governor (June 2, 1978), reprinted in FLA. H.R.J. I (Spec. Sess.
1978). The session began June 7, 1978. On June 6, the Trustees passed a resolution urging the
legislature to except sovereignty lands from MRTA's application.
82. Act of June 15, 1978, ch. 78-288, S 1, 1978 Fla. Laws. 820, 820 (codified at FLa. STAT.
S 712.03(7) (1985)).
83. "Such marketable record title shall not affect or extinguish the following rights: . . . (7)
State title to lands beneath navigable waters acquired by virtue of sovereignty." FLA. STAT. S
712.03(7) (1985).
84. See Powell, supra note 55, at 613-14.
85. See Askew v. Sonson, 409 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1981); Board of Trustees v. Paradise Fruit Co.,
414 So. 2d 10 (5th D.C.A. 1982), petition for review denied, 432 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1983); Laney v.
Board of Trustees, No. 79-1192 (16th Cir. Ct. June 30, 1980) (final summary judgment), aff'd,
399 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981); American Cyanamid Co. v. Board of Trustees, No. GCG80-290 (Fla. 10th Cir, Ct. July 27, 1981). In other respects, the bill was narrowly construed. See
Sonson, 409 So. 2d at 15 (holding the bill did not apply to section sixteen school lands); State v.
Contemporary Land Sales, Inc., 400 So. 2d 488, 492 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1981) (holding the bill did
not apply to sovereignty lands no longer under navigable waters).
86. Act of June 16, 1978, ch. 78-301, S 1, 1978 Fla. Laws 866, 866.
87.

STATE LANDS

88.

STAFF OF SENATE COMM.

MARKETA3LE

STUDY

COMMIT-rEE,

FINAL COMMITTEE

ON NATURAL

RECORD TITLE ACT (CHAP.

RESOURCES &

712, F.S.)

REPORT

(Mar. 1979).

CONSERVATION,

AND ITS OPERATION

A

REVIEW

OF THE

AGAINST STATE OWNED

LANDS (Jan. 1983).
89. HOUSE COMM. ON NATURAL RESOURCES, OVERSIGHT REPORT ON THE MARKETABLE RECORD
TITLE Aar (Feb. 5, 1985).

90. Act of June 7, 1985, ch. 85-83, S 1, 1985 Fla. Laws 578, 578 (codified at FLA. STAT.
5 712.02(2) (1985)). The subsection was to be automatically repealed on Oct. 1, 1986. Id. During
the period of its applicability, the Circuit Court in Brevard County declared this section unconstitutional. Saunders v. Board of Trustees, No. 85-5910-CA-B (Fla. 18th Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1985).
No other cases had an opportunity to challenge the moratorium prior to the Florida Supreme
Court's Coastal decision.
91.
Act of June 7, 1985, Ch. 85-83, S 2, 1985 Fla. Laws 578, 579. The 1985 legislature thus
postponed wrestling with the tough political issue of the retroactivity of the 1978 amendment. See
supra text accompanying notes 82-85 and infra text accompanying notes 238-39
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Commission met on a number of occasions, and ultimately, in a 9-8 split,
jointly issued majority and minority reports, with attached recommended leg,islation. The majority report offered a complex bill which would have granted
'
limited retroactive effect to the 1978 sovereignty lands exception.
The report and the two bills were forwarded to the legislature. However,
going into the final days of the 1986 session, the legislature still showed no
sign of resolving the issue. When the supreme court handed down the Coastal
decision, holding that MRTA did not divest the state of sovereignty lands, the
legislature breathed a collective sigh of relief, took no action on MRTA, and
adjourned.

IV.
A.

THE Coastal DECISION

Background -

A Tale of Two Companies

The Florida Supreme Court's decision in Coastal is an intermediate resting
point along an unfinished highway of litigation begun a decade ago. The dispute
began as a squabble over money between two companies. After early flashes
of brilliant tactical legal manuevering, the litigation underwent a metamorphosis
and became a vehicle for arguing a major public law issue - ownership of
Florida's lakes and rivers. Following the supreme court's resolution of the public
law issue, the private litigation will continue, probably as protracted trench
warfare in circuit court.
As one small part of the overall sale of 20 million acres of S&O lands, the
Trustees deeded out 80 acres of land located in Polk County through which
the Peace River flowed.!" The deed followed the customary form in that sections
or parts of sections were conveyed for the going rate of one dollar per acre."4
The deed contained no express reservation of the state's interest in the land
beneath the Peace River even though the river's location was plainly evident
on existing maps and surveys."' Subsequently, title passed to Mobil Oil Corporation which mined phosphate from portions of the land near the river."
This deed was merely one of many similar transactions involving lands in Polk
7
and Hillsborough Counties and along the Peace and Alafia Rivers.1
92.

See

93.

See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Coastal Petroleum Co., 671 F.2d 419, 421 (11th Cir.) (describing

FINAL REPORT,

Supra note 72.

the original deed under which Mobil claimed title), cerl. denied, 459 U.S. 970 (1982).
94.

See Deed No. 3,191 (Nov. 20, 1862).

95. Id.; see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Coastal Petroleum Co., 671 F.2d 419, 421 (11th Cir.)
(describing contents of deed), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 970 (1982). The surveyors' notes, made in
May, 1855, when the section lines were run, indicate the existence of the Peace River, and further
note "gigantic live oaks" along the section line near the river. See 200 SuRvEyoitS' NOTE 208
(1855). It seems that part of the land now alleged to be navigable bore these gigantic oaks.
96.

The phosphate operations did not involve mining the rivers, but rather the adjacent dry

lands.
97. The most notable transfers were the 1883 deeds from the Trustees to American Cyanamid
Co. and Estech, Inc., which were at issue in Coastal These are discussed in Coastal Petroleum
Co. v, American Cyanamid Co., 454 So. 2d 6, 7 (2d D.C.A. 1984), quashed, 492 So. 2d 339

(Fla. 1986).
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In 1941, having sold off the bulk of the S&O lands, 9 the Trustees set off
in a new direction. They were convinced that oil could be found beneath
Florida's coastal and inland waters, which would lead to handsome royalties
for the state."9 They entered into exploration contracts granting private companies the right to explore for oil, gas, or other minerals"" beneath sovereignty
lands. If the companies satisfied certain diligence requirements, they were granted
full-blown oil and gas leases.""
That same year, 1941, Exploration Contract No. 224 was granted to Coastal
Petroleum Company' 2 covering the Gulf coast from Port Charlotte to
Apalachicola"" together with certain bays and named river bottoms. Almost
immediately, Coastal and the Trustees fell into the first of a series of disputes.
Prior to granting the actual lease, the parties disagreed about whether Coastal
had satisfied the diligence requirements under the original exploration contract" 4
and about the potential environmental impact of oil slicks in the Gulf.""' Drilling
Lease No. 224-B was ultimately awarded to Coastal in 1946.1""
The record does not show what Coastal paid for the lease. Whatever the
price, it probably paid too much because a year later the lease of Gulf waters
became essentially worthless. In 1947 the United States Supreme Court held
that the federal government has "paramount rights in and power over" the
lands extending three miles seaward from a coastline." 7 Lease No. 224-B was
modified to reflect this decision."'
Round two occurred in 1954 when the Trustees took the position that the
grant of "other minerals" was limited to minerals which came from wells, not
mines. This triggered another flurry of litigation."" Having battled through two
98. See supra text accompanying notes 28-42.
99. Bums v. Coastal Petroleum Co., 194 So. 2d 71, 72 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1966), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 913 (1967).
100. See Drilling Lease No. 224-B (as modified) between Trustees of the Internal Improvement
Fund Book and Coastal Petroleum Co., 5 2, at 6 (Feb. 27, 1947) (filed Apr. 9, 1954, at Deed
Book 980, p. 418, of the Public Records of Polk County, Fla.) [hereinafter cited as 1947 Lease].
The lease focuses almost exclusively on oil and gas. The "other minerals" were an afterthought.
See Collins v. Coastal Petroleum Co., 118 So. 2d 796, 798-801 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1960) (discussing
interpretation of contract).
101. See Burns v. Coastal Petroleum Co., 194 So. 2d 71, 73 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1966), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 913 (1967).
102. Coastal Petroleum Co. was then named "Arnold Oil Explorations, Inc." The corporate

name was changed in 1946. See 1947 Lease, supra note 100, at 2.
103. The tidewater leases ran from the mean low water mark out 10.36 statute miles. 1947
Lease, supra note 100, at 2; see also Bums v. Coastal Petroleum Co., 194 So. 2d 71, 72 (Fla. 1st
D.C.A. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 913 (1967).
104. See Burns v. Coastal Petroleum Co., 194 So. 2d 71, 73 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1966), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 913 (1967).

105. Id.
106. Id. at 75.
107. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 38 (1947). United States v. Texas, 339 U.S.
707 (1950), predictably extended this principle to the waters of the Gulf of Mexico. The Submerged

Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. SS 1301-1315 (1982), later transferred title to these lands to the states.
108. See 1947 Lease, supra note 100.
109. See Collins v. Coastal Petroleum Co., 118 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1960). The court
affirmed the chancellor's decree holding that the 1947 Lease included phosphate ores, notwith-
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trials and two appeals over what minerals were covered by Lease No. 224-B,
they next fought over what lands were included in it. In the 1960's Coastal
filed suit to determine whether the lease included the bottom of Lake Hancock,
a meandered lake forming the headwaters of the Peace River."" Coastal prevailed at trial, only to lose on appeal."'
In the meantime, Coastal had hired Mobil Oil Company to perform certain
drilling work. Pursuant to a sublease agreement, Mobil was to receive an interest in Lease No. 224-B production as compensation. A dispute arose over
2
interpretation of the sublease. 1
Mobil sued Coastal, seeking a declaration of its rights."" Coastal counterclaimed, raising a far broader question than the interpretation of the sublease.
It claimed that Mobil, in its capacity as a riparian landowner and phosphate
extractor, had converted huge quantities of phosphate ore belonging to Coastal.
Mobil later filed a reply counterclaim, seeking a declaratory judgment to remove
the cloud cast on Mobil's title to the submerged land. The Trustees were
brought into the case as a necessary party to the quiet title action. ' 4 After
years of fighting,' Coastal and the Trustees found themselves on the same
side of a lawsuit.
Resolution of the conversion counterclaim turned on which corporation had
the right to extract phosphate from lands bordering a ten mile stretch of the
Peace River. Mobil claimed title to the fee interest under deeds from the Trustees. Coastal argued that the deeds, while facially absolute, were ineffective to
convey submerged bottoms. It argued that the Peace River was navigable and
standing the Trustees' contrary resolution passed March 23, 1954. It added that the Trustees were
entitled to a 10% royalty on such ores. Id. at 802-03. Coastal first made an abortive attempt to
have the entire question litigated in federal court. See Coastal Petroleum Co. v. Collins, 135 F.
Supp. 203 (N.D. Fla. 1954), modified, 234 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1955).
110. See Burns v. Coastal Petroleum Co., 194 So. 2d 71, 72 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1966), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 913 (1967).
111. Id. at 75. The opinion contains some curious inconsistencies which foreshadow the problem

in Coastal. The government surveyors meandered the Peace River from Port Charlotte north to
the boundary between Townships 38 and 39, a distance of less than 10 miles. Lease No. 224-B
covers "Peace River to Township 29/30," a distance over 54 miles north of where the meander
line stopped. Id. at 74. This grant implies that the Trustees had authority to convey the submerged
bottoms of the Peace River north to that point; and so by implication, that these were sovereignty
lands. Yet the court states in the same paragraph: "Peace River north of Township 38/39 is not
meandered and does not belong to the State. That is, Peace River for a distance 40 miles [sic]
south of Lake Hancock is in private ownership." Id.
112. Mobil's sublease was a traditional farm-out arrangement. Mobil was to pay the royalties
to the landowner (the Trustees) and perform the specified drilling work. It would earn a one-half
interest in the lease. The agreement stipulated that if the acreage covered by Coastal's lease was
diminished, Mobil's obligations would be proportionately reduced. It was this feature of the lease
that triggered Mobil's action against Coastal in Leon County Circuit Court.
113. See Board of Trustees v. Mobil Oil Corp., 455 So. 2d 412, 413 (2d D.C.A. 1984)
(discussing 1976 action in Leon County), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 492 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1986).
Counterclaims in the Leon County case are still pending.
114. Cf. FLA. STAT. 5 253.02(5) (1985) (Board of Trustees is a necessary party in actions
seeking to acquire submerged lands); id. S 65.041 (persons not parties to a quiet title action not
bound by adverse judgment).
115.

See supra text accompanying notes 102-12.
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thus the bottoms were, at the time of conveyance by the Trustees in 1862,
inalienable sovereignty lands. The 1946 Drilling Lease was the first and only
effective conveyance of these lands by their rightful owner, the State of Florida.
The resulting situation was ironic. Coastal, as lessee under Lease No. 224B, in effect, bought the Brooklyn Bridge when it leased thousands of square
miles of land under the Gulf of Mexico from someone other than its rightful
owner."" Thirty years later it sought to turn the tables and argue that Mobil
had also bought the Brooklyn Bridge from the same vendor, the Board of
Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund.
Coastal next took the initiative by bringing multiple actions in federal court
against the five major phosphate companies (other than Mobil) who had conducted mining operations on land near the Peace and Alafia Rivers."' Coastal
used the same theory it used in the Mobil counterclaim, arguing that each of
the defendants had converted phosphate ore belonging to Coastal under the
1946 lease.
A brushfire thus grew into a major conflagration. Lease No. 224-B became
potentially very valuable. Although oil and gas had never been produced, a lot
of phosphate had been mined along the Peace River. Coastal claimed the phosphate was all mined for its benefit because it alone was the true owner of the
minerals." ' Counsel to Coastal, now on the offensive, had formulated a $3
billion case.'
Coastal also persuaded the Trustees to join as voluntary plaintiffs in some
of the federal court actions.'"" The alliance made sense. If Coastal prevailed,
the Trustees would be entitled to a ten percent royalty' 2 ' on $3 billion of
phosphate ore allegedly converted. From Coastal's perspective, the presence of
116. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
117. See Coastal Petroleum Co. v. U.S.S. Agri-Chemicals, 695 F.2d 1314 (11th Cir. 1983)
(consolidation of four cases); Coastal Petroleum Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 673 F.2d 1343
(11th Cir.) (vacating trial court decision without opinion). These five cases, together with
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Coastal Petroleum Co., 671 F.2d 419 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 970
(1982), dissolved injunctions granted by the trial court prohibiting the deedholders from prosecuting
quiet title actions in the state courts.
118. Any interest the state once had in the phosphate ore was transferred to Coastal by Lease
224-B. Collins v. Coastal Petroleum Co., 118 So. 2d 796, 802-03 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1960).
119. Counsel had, at least temporarily, succeeded in getting the issue of who owned land in
Polk County away from the local courts, where they may have expected adverse trial court judgments
followed by nonappealable per curiam affirmed decisions by the Second District Court of Appeal. See
FLA. CONST. art. V, S 3 (Florida Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over per curiam affirmed judgments).
120. The Trustees are listed as "involuntary plaintiffs"in the litigation against Estech (formerly
Swift Agricultural Chemicals Corp.) and Grace. Coastal Petroleum Co. v. U.S.S. Agri-Chemicals,
695 F.2d 1314, 1314 (11th Cir. 1983). They joined voluntarily in Coastal's actions against the
other four: Mobil, American Cyanamid, U.S.S. Agri-Chemicals, and International Minerals &
Chemical. No explanation is found in the reported cases to explain the Trustees' differing postures.
The Trustees were joined by Mobil in its reply counterclaim because the Trustees were a necessary
party. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. The federal court actions were for conversion,
not to quiet title, so the Trustees were not indispensable parties in those suits.
121. 1947 Lease, supra note 100 (as interpreted in Collins v. Coastal Petroleum Co., 118 So.
2d 796 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1960)).
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the Trustees added legitimacy to its claim and permitted it to pose as the
defender of the public interest in an attack on the phosphate industry.
A classic procedural skirmish followed. Coastal fought to preserve federal
jurisdiction; the deedholders sought to get the issue before a Polk County Circuit
Court. The deedholders ultimately prevailed.2 Beginning in late 1980, seven
phosphate companies filed thirteen quiet title actions covering some 50,000 acres
of Polk County.' 2 ' In each case the trial court held for the plaintiff phosphate
company.'1 4 The Trustees' deeds trumped the 1946 lease.
The Trustees or Coastal appealed seven of the thirteen actions. The Second
District Court of Appeal summarily affirmed four of the actions, and affirmed
the other three actions in a written opinion which largely restated Odom.'2 " The
deedholders prevailed on three familiar independent summary grounds: (1) by
issuing the deed, the Trustees contemporaneously determined that the included
portions of the Peace River were not navigable; (2) even if navigable, the
Trustees are now legally estopped to deny either their ownership of the lands
on the date of sale or their authority to convey; and (3) in any event, MRTA

122. Coastal sought to establish federal jurisdiction on both federal question and diversity
grounds. Coastal argued the case presented a substantial federal question because whether the
disputed lands were sovereignty lands depended upon the navigability of the Peace River on March
3, 1845. Lands received by the state from the United States under the equal footing doctrine would
be sovereignty lands and not subject to alienation. After determining it had federal question jurisdiction, the district court enjoined the prosecution of state court quiet title actions begun by the
deedholders. Coastal Petroleum Co. v. U.S.S. Agri-Chemicals, 695 F.2d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir.
1983).
The deedholders appealed, arguing both that the trial court's order violated the Anti-Injunction
Act, 28 U.S.C. 5 2283 (1982), and that the district court lacked jurisdiction. In a previous case,
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Coastal Petroleum Co., 671 F.2d 419 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 970
(,1982), the Eleventh Circuit had held that the navigability issue presented no federal question,
because under Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977),
state law determines the extent of sovereignty lands retained in the state. Mobil Oil, 671 F.2d at
424.
In Agri-Chemicals, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that diversity jurisdiction did exist, because the
Trustees are a body separate from the State of Florida and thus citizens of Florida for diversity
purposes. Agri-Chemicals, 695 F.2d at 1317-18. Although the district court had jurisdiction, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the district court had abused its discretion in issuing the injunction.
The district court had issued the injunction under one of the exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act
to protect its jurisdiction. The Eleventh Circuit determined that the case presented no federal
question, only state law would apply, and no compelling need for federal jurisdiction existed. Id.
at 1318-19.
The Mobil litigation began in state court. Coastal successfully removed to federal court under
28 U.S.C. 5 1441 (1982) on the ground that a substantial federal question was involved. Mobil,
671 F.2d at 420. This litigation was subsequently dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the Eleventh
Circuit, and remanded to the state courts. Id. at 426. Coastal also sought unsuccessfully to remove
the quiet title actions to federal court in Tampa.
123. This is approximately 5% of the total land area of Polk County, a county encompassing
some 40 townships, each containing 36 square miles.
124. E.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Coastal Petroleum Co., No. GCG-82-3250 (Fla. 10th Cir. Ct.
May 24, 1983).
125. Coastal Petroleum Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 454 So. 2d 6 (2d D.C.A. 1984),
quashed, 492 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1986).
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any claim that the state might have had, including any sovereignty
extinguishes 21
'
claim.'
lands
The district court found that the issues it addressed were of great public
importance, and certified three questions to the Florida Supreme Court:
1. Do the 1883 swamp and overflowed lands deeds issued by the
lands below the ordinary high water mark
Trustees include sovereignty
27
of navigable waters?'
2. Does the doctrine of legal estoppel or estoppel by deed apply to
the 1883 swamp and overflowed deeds barring the Trustees' assertion
of title to sovereignty lands?
3. Does the Marketable Record Title Act . . . operate to divest
lands below the ordinary high water
the Trustees of title to sovereignty
mark of navigable rivers?128
B.

The Court Decides

The three questions were certified on July 13, 1984. The court heard oral
argument on May 6, 1985. In the year between argument and the court's
ultimate decision, the sovereignty lands question became the subject of scrutiny
12
in the legislature and the editorial pages. 9 On May 15, 1986, the court answered all three certified questions in the negative, a complete victory for Coastal

126. Id. at 8-9.
127. The court's formulation of the first question does not expressly mention the contemporaneous findings aspect of its analysis. This proved to be important, given the Florida Supreme
Court's treatment of the first question. &e infra text accompanying notes 130-34.
128. Coastal Petroleum Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 454 So. 2d 6, 9-10 (2d D.C.A.
1984), quashed, 492 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1986).
129. An uncommon delay followed oral argument, and speculation grew as to its cause. One
member of the court who heard oral argument, Justice Alderman, retired from the court. A special
MRTA commission headed by former Speaker of the House Hyatt Brown was appointed. The
commission convened, heard testimony, and filed a report nearly evenly-divided on what the legislature should do to cure the MRTA problem. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 72. The 1986 legislative
session began with several bills pre-filed on the MRTA question.
On Wednesday, May 14, 1986, with the waning legislative session having reached -no consensus
on MRTA, a Tallahassee radio station reported that the Coasal decision would be handed down
on May 22, and that it would be in favor of the state. The radio report proved correct, except
as to timing. The opinion was published the next day.
The political fight is not without irony. Coastal and the Trustees gained the high moral ground,
casting their position as one prompted by environmental concerns. However, the more liberal
advocates of the Coastal/Trustees position might be surprised to learn that their efforts, if successful,
would inure to the benefit of the family of William F. Buckley, Sr., which controls Coastal. See
S. Miller, UPI wire story (Feb. 7, 1982).
The irony was not lost on the Chief Justice:
Contrary to the various suggestions that the present cases pertain to issues of environmental protection, it should be made known that what these cases involve is money.
...[T]here is no showing that if the board prevails, phosphate mining will cease...
[A]ny lingering notions that these cases concern ecology should be dispelled.
Coastal, 492 So. 2d at 349 (Boyd, C.J., dissenting).
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and the Trustees. Justice Shaw's majority opinion moved briskly through the
three questions.
1. The Contemporaneous Determination Issue
The first question received the most ink. The court treated the question
certified - does a S&O lands deed include any sovereignty lands that happen
to lie within the deed's legal description - literally. The majority presupposed
the Peace River was navigable at statehood and that the case, therefore, involved
true sovereignty lands.'"'
The court's analysis was logical and straightforward.'
Title to all sovereignty lands was automatically vested in the legislature on March 3, 1845 under
the equal footing doctrine. Title to S&O lands was vested in the Trustees
piecemeal as they received federal patents under the Swamp and Overflowed
Lands Act. At the time of the original conveyance into private hands, the
Trustees had title to S&O lands, but did not have title to the sovereignty lands.
Under general rules of property law, a grantor cannot convey that which he
does not own. Therefore, the Trustees' deeds could not and did not convey
title to the sovereignty lands. Even if the Trustees fully intended to convey the
submerged bottoms, and even if the grantees believed in good faith that they
were receiving title to all the acreage they paid for, the result was the same.
One can hardly quarrel with this logic. Case law has long distinguished
between S&O and sovereignty lands, traditionally on the basis of how easily
these lands could be sold to private parties. S&O lands have always been freely
alienable by the Trustees. One can even argue that the federal patents naming
the state as grantee impose on the state an affirmative duty of prompt retransfer
to private hands, so as to implement the underlying congressional policy of
reclamation." ' Conveyances of sovereignty lands have been upheld by the courts,
but only after scrutiny of the transaction to determine whether the conveyance
was both deliberate and pursuant to some finding of an attendant public interest. "' The novelty in Coastal is one of emphasis. The traditional policy-based
130. Cf Coastal, 492 So. 2d at 342-43. Nowhere in the prior course of the litigation is the
Peace River characterized as navigable. All prior cases treated navigability as the issue to be decided.

The Trustees used this as the basis of their claim of federal question jurisdiction: "[W]hether a
river is navigable so that the submerged lands pass to the state at statehood is a federal question

supporting federal jurisdiction." Mobil Oil Corp. v. Coastal Petroleum Co., 671 F.2d 419, 423
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 970 (1982).

131. See 492 So. 2d at 342-43.
132. The Swamp and Overflowed Lands Act of 1850, 43 U.S.C. SS 981-994 (1982), contemplates reclamation by private interests. The Trustees were hardly dilatory in their conveyancing to
private hands. No occasion existed for a developer to pursue an action in mandamus against the
Trustees to compel more rapid sale of the S&O lands.

133. The rules here have shifted over time. The earliest case, State v. Black River Phosphate
Co., 32 Fla. 83, 13 So. 640 (1893), construed a statute which arguably extended all riparian titles

along navigable rivers from the OHWL down to the edge of the channel. The court narrowly
construed the statute, holding that only those riparian landowners who built wharves connecting
the OHWL and the channel edge received title to the sovereignty bottoms, and then only to a
limited extent. 32 Fla. at 114-15, 13 So. at 650.

The Black River Phosphate court began by distinguishing between S&O and sovereignty lands.
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distinction - the notion that greater deliberation must attend the sale of sovereignty lands - was overwhelmed by a new, mechanical distinction. During
the nineteenth century, the executive branch owned the S&O lands and the
legislative branch owned the sovereignty lands. Based solely on this mechanical
distinction, the majority concluded that the 1883 Trustees' deeds did not convey
sovereignty lands. The precise question certified was answered: No.
The supreme court, like the first gravedigger in Hamlet,"i4 was perhaps too
literal in its treatment of the first question. The lower court saw this question
as an evidentiary one. The dispute it addressed was the navigability ved non of
an unmeandered ten mile stretch of the Peace River on March 3, 1845, an
issue of fact. The issue of law was the weight to be given various governmental
actions taken (or not taken) during the nineteenth century. These acts and
omissions include the failure of the official surveyors to meander this stretch
of the Peace River; the failure of the Trustees to make either an express grant
or an express reservation of sovereignty lands in their standard form S&O lands
deeds; and the effect of the language of the patents from the federal government
to the Trustees. The court below held that the sum of these prior governmental
actions amounted to a conclusive determination that the deeds contained no
sovereignty lands. '
Chief Justice Boyd's dissenting opinion adopts the lower court's view:
The official surveys containing no meandering showing navigable rivers, the federal patents issued pursuant to congressional authorization
under the Swamp and Overflowed Lands Act of 1850, the official state
requests for such patents, and the Trustees' deeds of the lands in question
as swamp and overflowed lands, taken together, constitute official, contemporaneous determinations that the lands in question were swamp and
overflowed lands and that any waters lying thereon were not navigable. The Trustees' determination that land is of a character that gives
them the authority to sell it is not subject to collateral attack."'
Id. at 84, 13 So. at 641. The opinion first holds that sovereignty lands came to "the state" on
March 3, 1845. Id. at 93-94, 13 So. at 644. It later suggests that legal title to sovereignty lands
is held by the legislature in trust for the people. Id. at 98, 13 So. at 645. Since the legislature
clearly intended to deed sovereignty lands to private hands - the only ambiguity lay in the extent
of the intended grant - the court was forced to conclude that "the state's" title was held by the
legislature. Id. at 98-99, 13 So. at 645. Otherwise, the purported conveyance would be wholly ultra
vires, and the entire act unconstitutional.
In 1917, the legislature conveyed title to lands under tidal waters to the Trustees. Act of May
21, 1917, ch. 7304, S 1, 1917 Fla. Laws 116. Title to freshwater sovereignty lands was conveyed
in 1969. Act of July 5, 1969, ch. 69-308, 1969 Fla. Laws 1112 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT.
S 253.12(1) (1985)). In 1969, the voters added article X, S II to the Florida Constitution, expressly
conditioning future sales of sovereignty lands upon a finding of public purpose. The addition of
article X, S 11 has been interpreted as "a constitutional codification of the public trust doctrine
contained in our case law" rather than a substantive change in the law. Coastal, 492 So. 2d at
344.
134. "How absolute this knave is! we must speak by the card! or equivocation will undo us."
Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, act V, scene i, COMPLETE WORKS OF W. SHAKESPEARE 1106 (1975).
135. See Coastal Petroleum Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 454 So. 2d 6, 8 (2d D.C.A.
1984), quashed, 492 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1986).
136. Coastal, 492 So. 2d at 345 (Boyd, C.J., dissenting).
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The majority opinion, on the other hand, devotes only a single sentence to
this issue. Meander lines run by the federal surveyors have presumptive effect,
but are not conclusive. 1' 3 7 The majority opinion does not mention the other
governmental acts, presumably because they have no evidentiary weight. The
chief justice would give the ancient governmental acts conclusive weight. The
majority holds that these acts create, at best, a rebuttable presumption against
navigability.
2.

The Estoppel Issue

The next certified question raised two separate issues, one concerning the
doctrine of legal estoppel, completely ignored in the majority opinion, and the
second, the related doctrine of estoppel by deed. The majority opinion emphasized the legislative ownership of sovereignty lands and the executive ownership
of S&O lands. The general rule is that one may not sell that which one does
not own.
A corollary to this rule presented a serious obstacle for Coastal and the
Trustees. If a grantor does purport to convey that which he does not own, and
then later acquires title to the property in question, the after-acquired title inures
immediately to the benefit of the original purchaser. The Coastal facts offer a
textbook case for application of this doctrine of estoppel by deed." '
Here the majority restricts its earlier analysis. The you-can't-sell-what-youdon't-own rule operates whether or not the Trustees intended to sell the sovereignty lands. The intent which was earlier irrelevant now becomes crucial.
The court stresses that the Trustees in fact did not intend to convey sovereignty
lands in their nineteenth century deeds. Because they lacked the requisite intent,
the court concludes their subsequent acquisition of title to the lands does not
trigger estoppel by deed. '3!
3.

The Role of Precedent in the First and Second Certified Questions

The chief justice in his dissent, observes:
Much has been written and spoken, in the communications media
and elsewhere, Concerning the legal issues in this case and the related
political issues. Many have suggested that the courts are being asked
to give away state-owned lands. The truth is that the lands in question

137. Id. at 342. In a footnote, the court states that a "meander line creates a rebuttable
presumption of navigability." Id. at 342 n.1. Presumably the obverse is true, that is, a failure to meander
creates a rebuttable presumption of non-navigability.
138. See J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 278 (2d ed. 1975).
[T]he better view is that the doctrine [of estoppel by deed] operates to 'feed the estoppel',
i.e., it transfers the title automatically to [the grantee under the defective deed], rather
than furnishing him with an equitable defense if sued by [the grantor] or his privies. This
is the better view because it allows the title examiner to rely on this after-acquired title
as a link in the chain of tide.

Id.
139.

Coastal, 492 So. 2d at 343.
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here, as well as other lands, were legally conveyed by authorized state
officials."4
Through the barriers of judicial restraint, one senses that the chief justice is
accusing his brethren of rendering a political decision.
The implicit charge cannot be ignored. The majority opinion, while structured in good legal form, pays but passing attention to the first certified question
and wholly ignores one half of the second question. Most of the text is merely
a statement of the obvious: you cannot sell what you do not own. A more
substantial defect, however, is the majority's treatment of precedent in addressing the first two questions.
The opinion contains a number of citations, but only to ancient cases. The
most recent case cited for substance was decided a half century ago, ' 4' and
Martin v. Busch,14 2 the primary case relied on by the court, was handed down
in 1927. Reliance on old precedent, of course, is not bad. Indeed, the process
may enhance the notion of the continuity and stability of the law. The problem
is that the majority opinion simply ignores the last 50 years of Florida case
law.
The omission of two recent supreme court cases is especially troubling. Odom
presented the court with the same three issues ten years earlier and arose in
a factually and procedurally similar fashion.14i A trial court ruled that certain
facially absolute deeds failed to convey submerged bottoms and granted the
deedholder's motion for summary judgment against the Trustees. ' 4 The other
4
sovereignty lands case, Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund v. Lobean,'1
holds
legal estoppel is applicable against the Trustees' claim of prior mistake and lack
of authority to convey.14" Lobean is completely ignored in the majority opinion,
thus raising the question of whether Coastal overrules Lobean entirely or only
in river cases. The majority discusses Odom later in its opinion; Lobean appears
only in the dissent.
4.

MRTA, Notice of Navigability and the Odom Case

The third certified question involved the operation of MRTA on sovereignty
lands. MRTA is an independent means of resolution, totally divorced from the
contemporaneous determination and estoppel arguments. The deedholders ar140. Id. at 349 (Boyd, C.J., dissenting).
141. See Borax Consol. Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935) (cited in Coastal, 492
So. 2d at 342).
142. 93 Fla. 535, 112 So. 274 (1927).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71.
144. See Odom v. Deltona Corp., 341 So. 2d 977, 979-87 (Fla. 1976) (quoting trial court

opinion in full).
145. 127 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1961). "Certainly it seems unconscionable for the state, which should
set a prime example in integrity to its citizens, to sell land to one of its citizens and then several
years later attempt to sell it again on the excuse that it had acted illegally in issuing the first
deed." Lobean v. Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund, 118 So. 2d 226, 230 (1st D.C.A. 1960),
aff'd, 127 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1961).

146.

127 So. 2d at 104.
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gued that MRTA extinguished the state's title to sovereignty lands. Specifically,
MRTA extinguishes any non-record interest in land in favor of a deedholder
who can show an unbroken thirty-year chain of title.' 47 -The state's sovereignty
lands claim, by its very nature, does not appear of record; thus, according to

the deedholders, MRTA vests fee simple title to the alleged sovereignty lands
48
in them.'
At this point in its analysis, the majority first addresses Odom. The court
states:
Respondents and the courts below rely on [Odom] for the proposition
that the state's title to navigable water beds previously conveyed as [S&O]
lands is extinguished by MRTA. This reliance is misplaced. In Odom
we rejected the state's argument that the notice of navigability concept
applied to the grantees of [S&O] lands under certain trustees' deeds
because 'it seems absurd to apply this test to small, non-meandered lakes
and ponds of less than 140 acres and, in many cases, less than 50 acres
in surface.' The ground on which Odom rests is this factual determination
that the small lakes and ponds at issue were non-navigable, non-sovereignty lands. Unfortunately, even though this factual determination
controlled and resolved the case, we went on to answer irrelevant arguments put to us by the parties .

.

.

. The statements concerning

the effect of MRTA on navigable waterbeds were dicta and are nonbinding in the instant case
inasmuch as there were no navigable wa49
terbeds at issue in Odom.1
Thus, the court treats the MRTA issue as one of first impression.
In deciding this point the court turns to the same logical technique it used
in analyzing the first certified question. Here, the syllogism of silence runs: (1)
sovereignty lands have always been an important asset of the state; (2) MRTA
as passed by the 1963 legislature did not make "special reference" to sovereignty
lands; therefore, (3) the 1963 "legislature did not intend to make MRTA applicable to sovereignty lands.""" Significantly, this conclusory analysis contains
neither citation to the previous case law developed by the lower courts in the
ten-year wake of Odom,'' nor reference to the text or legislative history of either
52
MRTA as enacted in 1963 or the 1978 amendment to MRTA.'
Finally, without deciding the issue, the court implies that the legislature
could not constitutionally convey sovereignty lands, even if MRTA, as passed

147. FLA. STAT. S 712.04 (1985).
148. Coastal, 492 So. 2d at 344.
149. Id. (citations omitted). While the court suggests the largest lake in question was 140 acres,
an examination of the state maps for Hernando and Volusia Counties indicates some of these lakes
are considerably larger. See State Topographic Office, General Highway Map of Hernando County
(Dec. 1974) (Hunters Lake in Hernando County occupies the greater part of Section 32, Township
23 South, Range 17 East); State Topographic Office, General Highway Map of Volusia County
(July 1973) (Lake Dupont, Theresa Lake, and the Lake Butler Chain each appears to be considerably larger than 140 acres).
150. 492 So. 2d at 344.
151. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 54-68 and 79-92.
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in 1963, had specifically indicated a legislative intent to do so, "without explicitly basing [the conveyance] on the public interest.""'
5.

Distinguishing Precedents

Coastal may fairly be criticized for its apparent indifference towards precedent. The majority opinion engages in disingenuous descriptions of the two
controlling precedents, Martin and Odom. The court reads Martin as establishing
an abstract rule of law that Trustees' deeds were subject to an implied notice
'4
of navigability. 5
The later case, Odom, is treated as an exception to the Martin rule. Odom
is confined to narrow facts. Ponds of less than a quarter section are apparently
non-navigable per se. The court dismisses the rest of the opinion as dicta." A
fair reading of Odom reveals a clear decision that title to unmeandered waterbodies passed to private interests upon conveyance by the Trustees." ' Accordingly, the state would not be given a day in court to prove that a particular
waterbody was navigable at statehood. Thus, regardless of whether the waterbodies were navigable, and the submerged bottoms were therefore sovereignty
lands, the deedholder should prevail against the state.
In fairness to the majority, however, the opinion is demonstrably faithful
to a deeper level of precedent. The opinion adheres to an established judicial
technique for avoiding an unjust result seemingly compelled by precedent. For
convenience, this technique is referred to as Birkett's Technique, in honor of
the justice of the King's Bench whose opinion is the paradigm.157
1
1 has long introduced stuProfessor John Cribbet's casebook on property"

153. 492 So. 2d at 344. Although the conveyance predated the passage of article X, section
11 of the Florida Constitution, the court found that provision "is largely a constitutional codification
of the public trust doctrine contained in our case law." See generally SAVE OUR HOMES & LANDS,
INC.,

AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF FLORIDA'S MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT ON PUBLIC AND

RIGHTS 14-34 (presentation to MRTA Study Commission Aug. 15, 1985) (analyzing public
trust doctrine in context of sovereignty lands).
154. See Coastal, 492 So. 2d at 342 n.1. Martin is a very complicated case, frequently miscited
because of its complex facts, the sheer volume of Justice Whitfield's opinion, and errors made in
its abstracting and headnoting. The decision is based on a boundary line issue. The Trustees' deed
conveyed land, one boundary of which was the OHWL of a stretch of Lake Okeechobee, a navigable
but then unsurveyed waterbody. The OHWL changed avulsively between the date of the Trustees'
deed and the eventual survey. Martin simply holds that the -earlier OHWL established the public/
private boundary line. Any discussion of an implied notice of navigability is necessarily dicta when,
as in Martin, the OHWL is an express boundary of land conveyed. Martin, 93 Fla. at 571-72, 112
So. at 286.
155. Coastal, 492 So. 2d at 344.
156. The lower courts concurred in this suggested interpretation of Odom. See supra text accompanying notes 69-92. The 1978 Study Commission took the same view of Odom. See Final
Report, supra note 72. And, Odom was the explicit basis for the legislature's enactment of the antiOdom rule of FLA. STAT. S 712.03(7) (1985). See Act of June 15, 1978, ch. 78-288, 1978 Fla. Laws
820; supra text accompanying notes 79-92 (discussing the debate surrounding the application of
MRTA to sovereignty lands); infra text accompanying notes 172-74 (pointing out that Odom rose
on summary judgment, thus there was no resolution of factual navigability).
157. Cf. Hannah v. Peel, [19451 1 K.B. 509 (per Birkett, J.); infra text accompanying notes
164-67.
158. J. CRIBBET & C. JOHNSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY (5th ed. 1984).
PRIVATE
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dents to the law of property with the so-called Finders cases, a series of three
cases decided by the justices of the King's Bench, which illustrate Birkett's
Technique. These cases resolve the question of who, as between the finder of
lost property and other legitimate claimants, is entitled to possession. The first
case, Bridges v. Hawkesworth,"j concerned a bundle of bank notes found by a
traveling salesman on the floor of a shop with which he had dealings. The
finder was held entitled to possession as against the shopkeeper.""'
The second case, South Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman, 6 ' concerned two
gold rings found at the bottom of a minster pool. The fee owner claimed rights
to possession of the rings, on the theory that as owner of the fee interest he
had legal possession of all things attached to the land. The finder, a man
employed by the fee owner to clean the pool, invoked the finder-keeper rule
of Bridges. The court ruled in favor of the fee owner based on the legal possession
theory advanced by the owner. 2 Bridges was distinguished on the grounds that
the bank notes were found in a public part of the shop, and were thus never
"
in the legal possession of the shopkeeper. "
The final case, Hannah v. Peel,164 concerned a brooch found by Corporal
Hannah in a house owned by Major Peel. The major's house had been requisitioned by His Majesty's government during the war. Corporal Hannah
was stationed in the house, and came across the brooch while adjusting blackout
curtains in the sickbay. Justice Birkett's opinion carefully depicts the corporal
as a good and honest fellow, whose conduct was "commendable and meritorious."'" The court's description of the major suggests that he was something
of a cad, profiteering from the war. Given the court's gratuitous evaluation of
to find the "right"
the intrinsic worth of the two litigants, one is not surprised
66
brooch.
the
gets
Hannah
Corporal
reached.
is
result
Reaching the "right" result requires judicial dexterity in the handling of
precedent. The Sharman rule apparently controls the Hannah facts. Justice Birkett,
however, distinguishes Sharman by calling it an agency case, since the finder
was employed by the fee owner. He confines Sharman to agency situations,
despite the Sharman court's express statement that the agency relationship was
not outcome determinative. 167 Bridges is quoted lavishly in the Hannah opinion
and becomes the general rule that governs the outcome in favor of the corporal.

159.

21 L.J.Q.B. 75 (n.s. 1851).

160. Id. at 78. As in all the finders cases, the courts carefully limit the interest of the victor
to that of possession, preserving for an absent ultimate owner the right to one day enter the scene
and assert his paramount legal title.
161. [1896] 2 Q.B. 44.
162.

Id. at 46.

163. Id. at 47.
164. [1945] 1 K.B. 509.
165. Id. at 521.
166. Id.
167. "[Counsel argues that Sharman] establishes that if a man finds a thing as the servant or
agent of another, he finds it not for himself, but for that other, and indeed that seems to afford
a sufficient explanation of the case." Id. at 519. This can hardly be squared with the statement
in Sharman that "there was no special contract between the plaintiffs and defendant as to giving
up any articles that might be found." [1896] 2 Q.B. at 44.
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Justice Shaw's treatment of precedent in Coastal is structurally identical to
Justice Birkett's in Hannah. Martin, like Bridges, is treated as an abstract rule
of law. Its facts are not even mentioned. Odom, like Sharman, is distinguished
from the earlier case on purely factual grounds, with no inquiry into the reasoning. Odom is treated as containing, in effect, no rule of law. Finally, Justice
Shaw reaches the "right" result. The state's claim to ownership of submerged
bottoms survives both the Trustees' deed and MRTA's enactment.
The Birkett Technique has both its costs and its benefits, whatever the
context of its application. The cost is, principally, the confusion of prior precedent. An Orwellian revision occurs. The case that used to mean X now means
Y. This cost has both aesthetic and real components. The aesthetic component
is always present, acting to disturb the symmetry of the law and, consequently,
the minds of students and scholars seeking to make sense of the authorities.
The real cost is a function of the magnitude of the intervening reliance. One
must ask to what extent parties have relied on the second case in the Birkett
trilogy in planning their economic affairs. It is unlikely that a generation of
finders relied on Sharman only to have their right of possession disturbed by
Hannah v. Peel. It is far more likely that a decade of parties to real property
transactions, both sales and mortgage transactions, relied on Odom and its apparent holding that a clear chain of title back to a clean patent or deed out
was free of any potential sovereignty lands cloud."6 8
The principal benefit of the Birkett Technique is that it achieves a result
thought "just" by the members of the court. Justice Birkett likely believed that
he did a small justice to Corporal Hannah. Justice Shaw undoubtedly believes
that he worked a great justice for the people of Florida. Indeed, the sub silentio
determination that the costs are outweighed by the benefits must always be
present whenever a court invokes the Birkett Technique; were it otherwise, the
court would naturally follow the easier path of "being controlled" by the more
recent precedent.
The secondary benefit of the Birkett Technique is that it adheres to the
doctrine of stare decisis. Both Sharman and Odom remain nominally vital. A
direct overruling of Odom would admit that it existed as controlling precedent
for a decade, giving rise to potentially expensive taking claims by landowners
who could demonstrate that rights vested in them under Odom were obliterated
without compensation by Coastal.'"'
6.

The Role of Logic and the Meaning of Coastal

The basis of the Coastal decision is logic, not precedent. More particularly,
168. See infra text at 5 V (discussing the likely impact of Coastal on Florida real property law).
169. The use of Birkett's technique is not a talisman guaranteed to ward off the taking argument. It does, at a minimum, make the taking argument more difficult. The movant would
argue that the third case is a de facto overruling of the second. This argument is likely to succeed,

if at all, only by collateral attack; it is highly unlikely that the Florida Supreme Court would later
hold that Coastal overruled Odom. The federal courts would be marginally more likely to take such
a step, but even there, such second guessing is unlikely. See Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
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the syllogism of silence is the logical foundation of the entire opinion. One
aspect of the decision, however, is illogical. This logical flaw must be examined
to help predict how future courts will interpret the law of sovereignty lands.
The lower court relied in part on a statute describing the extent of navigable
waters:
Navigable waters in this state shall not be held to extend to any permanent or transient waters in the form of so-called lakes, ponds, swamps
or overflowed lands, lying over and upon areas which have heretofore
been conveyed to private individuals by the United States or by the state
without reservation of public rights in and to said waters.' 7"
The lower court found the statute straightforward. Given a "clean" conveyance
out to private hands, the statute precludes any subsequent claim that the lands
were in part inalienable sovereignty lands.
The supreme court held that this potentially troubling statute was not "pertinent to the issues at hand. We are dealing with navigable rivers not 'so-called
lakes, ponds, swamps, or overflowed lands.' ,, This distinction, while not
obviously strained or artificial, is trebly flawed.
a.

The Statement of the Question Contains the Answer

The supreme court said that "we are dealing with navigable rivers." Yet
this is the crux of the dispute between the parties. Coastal wants a day in
court to bring in its experts and prove that the Peace River was navigable at
statehood. Cyanamid argued that it wins whether or not Coastal is able to
prove navigability. The lower courts agreed with Cyanamid, and granted its
motion for summary judgment. Procedurally, when the case reached the supreme court there simply had been no factual determination of navigability.
The court's statement that "we are dealing with navigable rivers" cannot be
a judicial determination of that fact. The majority remanded the case for a
trial on this very issue, a pointless exercise if the supreme court has already
authoritatively determined that the Peace River was navigable at statehood. The
court surely means that "we are dealing with allegedly navigable rivers." The
absence of the adverb is perhaps a mere oversight or scrivener's error. Absent
the second flaw in the court's distinction, this would merit only passing attention.
b.

The Characterization of Odom

A parallel flaw occurs in the supreme court's analysis of the Odom case:
170. Coastal, 492 So. 2d at 343 (quoting FLA. STAT. S 197.228(2) (1981)). In 1985, this statute
was renumbered and is now found in chapter 253, dealing with state lands, rather than in chapter
197, dealing with taxation. See FLA. STAT. S 253.141(2) (1985); see also id. S 253.141(3) (permitting

private ownership of lands submerged under non-meandered lakes); id. S 253.141(4) (subjecting
privately-owned lands submerged under navigable waters to ad valorem taxation).
171. Coastal, 492 So. 2d at 344. This "factual determination" refers to the passage of the Odom
opinion distinguishing between Hog Pond and Lake Okeechobee, Odom, 341 So. 2d at 988.
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"The ground on which Odom rests is this factual determination that the small
lakes and ponds at issue were non-navigable, non-sovereignty lands."'7 2 Odom,
like Coastal, arose on appeal from an order granting the deedholder's motion
for summary judgment. There was never a factual determination that the ponds
at issue in Odom were (or were not) navigable. Again, this is the entire point
of a motion for summary judgment; the need for a complex trial on the issue
of historic navigability is avoided.
Yet, the Coastal court announces that its earlier decision in Odom "rests [on
the] factual determination that the small lakes and ponds at issue were nonnavigable."'" Procedurally, the sovereignty claimant alleged in its pleadings
that Hog Pond was navigable and for purposes of the decision granting summary
judgment, the court could assume that the allegation was true. 7 4 But there can
be no logical basis for the Coastal court to elevate that assumption, made in
the course of a summary disposition, to the level of res judicata.
In summary, the Coastal court commits parallel errors in its characterization
of the state of the facts of both cases. It states that the Peace River is navigable,
and that the Hog Pond was not. In truth, the triers of fact made no determination whatsoever as to the complex navigability issues in either case. The
apparent confusion may be partially resolved by looking to an implicit distinction
offered by the Coastal court.
c.

The Dimensional Distinction: Round and Straight Waterbodies

There is another, albeit unstated, line of analysis which seems to resolve
the perplexing distinction between "navigable rivers" and "so-called lakes, ponds,
swamps, or overflowed lands."'" The three big cases, Martin, Odom and Coastal,
each deal with separate species of waterbodies. The Coastal dispute does indeed
deal with rivers, not ponds - with one-dimensional lines, not two-dimensional
circles.
After Coastal, the real meaning to be attributed to the cases may be that
rivers and other straight waterbodies are to be treated differently from lakes,
ponds and round waterbodies. Taken a step further, Coastal can be read to
hold that, as a matter of law: Lake Okeechobee and other large lakes are
navigable per se; small ponds of less than 140 acres are non-navigable per se;
and rivers require a case-by-case determination.
The suggested distinction between straight and round waterbodies, coupled
with the implicit per se rules of law, could explain the court's statements concerning the non-navigability of Hog Pond. This statement is otherwise unsupportable under traditional methods of interpreting cases. It simply must be a
per se rule of law masquerading as a finding of fact.
172. See Coastal, 492 So. 2d at 343.
173. Id.
174. If the case had arisen in a code pleading jurisdiction, and the deedholder had entered
a demurrer, the assumption as to navigability would have been explicit. In the modern summary

judgment context, the proper standard is the absence of a "genuine issue as to any material fact."
FLA. R. Civ. PRO. S 1.510(c).
175. Coastal, 492 So. 2d at 343.
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Second, the notion that ponds are fundamentally different from rivers is
supported by the statutory passage quoted above. The legislature arguably distinguished between ponds and rivers when it enacted Chapter 197. The court
might have written:
Ponds and other "round" waterbodies are expressly listed in
the omission of rivers and other "straight" waterbodies is
under the expressio unius principle of statutory construction.
lative distinction will 7be respected by the judicial branch.
different from ponds.'

S 197.228;
purposeful
This legisRivers are

,

Since Coastal is the first straight waterbody case to reach the court, it is truly
a case of first impression. The law of ponds and other round waterbodies
seemingly has but marginal precedential value in river cases.
This dimensional distinction is available for use by later courts in harmonizing Odom and Coastal. The distinction appears novel. The court offers no
precedent, nor have the authors found such a distinction in the course of their
research. Should this distinction be elevated to a rule of law, the effect on land
titles in Florida is probably, on balance, salutary; the underlying question of
navigability vel non created by Coastal would be largely confined to rivers, streams
and other one-dimensional waterbodies.'17 Finally, in fairness to the court, there
7
is an unstated logical basis for the distinction. Navigability, it will be seen,' 1
depends on susceptibility for use as an instrument of commerce. A river is
generally more susceptible to such use in that it permits the transport of goods
or people from Point A to Point B; from the headwaters to the Gulf or ocean,
and then beyond. A pond or lake, unless it reaches the size of Lake Okeechobee,
is of only marginal usefulness for commerce. The alternative of portage around
the perimeter is generally available and equally expedient.
The eventual role of Coastal in the constellation of case precedent must await
further judicial action. Whatever its eventual interpretation, a claimant can no
longer use the three summary bases developed over the last decade to resolve
a sovereignty claim. Resolution of future sovereignty lands disputes can occur
7
only through a full trial on the merits.' 1
176. A far more powerful basis for distinguishing section 197.228 of the Florida Statutes was
available to the court, but went unmentioned. A year earlier, the court had described that statute
as a taxing statute inapplicable to property law determinations. Belvedere Dev. Corp. v. Department
of Transp., 476 So. 2d 649, 653 (Fla. 1985). The process begun in Belvedere could have been
completed in Coastal. To apply section 197.228 in Coastal, however, would be to concede that it

applied to rivers and other "straight" waterbodies.
On the other hand, even if the Belvedere rationale were extended, a logical inconsistency would
emerge. Deedholders would be paying ad valorem taxes on land they did not own. Moreover, in
the 1985 Florida Statutes, section 197.223 was moved from chapter 197 to chapter 253, which
deals with ownership of state lands. See supra note 170. The court's failure to invoke Belvedere thus
seems to suggest that it wished to emphasize the rule that small ponds are per se non-navigable.
177. The issue of the location of the "true" OHWL would remain for judicial determination
in both river and lake cases. The per se rule of law would, however, eliminate (or greatly reduce)
the import of the navigability issue.
178. See infra text accompanying notes 184-96.
179. Some courts have used the doctrine of equitable estoppel to resolve sovereignty land
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On remand, the issues before the trial court will be twofold: first, whether
the relevant stretch of the Peace River was navigable in fact on March 3, 1845;
and second, assuming it was navigable, where the boundary lines between the
sovereignty lands and privately owned uplands are located.
V.

LOOKING FORWARD FROM Coastal

Coastal declares"" a zone of ambiguity in Florida land titles. After Coastal,
there is a broad class of deedholders who can show record title to lands which
they simply do not own. The ambiguity is an irreducible result of the nature
of the transaction vesting title to sovereignty lands in the state. Because no
document of title describes by metes and bounds the extent of sovereignty lands,
title searchers cannot access a record to determine whether a particular parcel
of land is subject to the state's sovereignty ownership claim."''
The scope of this zone of ambiguity is unclear. As noted in the chief
justice's dissent, the sovereignty lands controversy has both political and legal
components." 2 The political elements emphasized the title to currently submerged, currently navigable bottoms. This characterization would have relatively
little impact on Florida land titles because a presently dry parcel of land would
be free of any sovereignty lands claim.
Unfortunately, rules of property law, rather than the clear-cut political characterizations, will define the operative zone of ambiguity. Sound public policy
may call for a rule declaring state ownership of currently navigable waterbodies
from riverbank to riverbank, ":" perhaps in conjunction with a claim to a contiguous strip of land sufficient to permit canoeists to rest and picnic even when

the waters are high. However, existing rules of property law simply will not
produce such a neat, convenient result. They tend instead to operate in a
general, gross, mechanical fashion likely to generate great uncertainty and ultimately result in a crazy-quilt pattern of state ownership.
The next portion of this article describes the rules of property law which
will establish the boundaries of sovereignty lands and also the likely dimensions
of the zone of ambiguity created by these rules.

disputes. Under this doctrine the deedholder must show: (1) some representation by the state, (2) on
which he relied to his detriment, (3) causing substantial harm. Courts have held that equitable
estoppel applied against the Trustees. Odom v. Deltona Corp., 341 So. 2d 977, 989 (Fla. 1976);
Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund v. Claughton, 86 So. 2d 775, 792 (Fla. 1956); seeRosen,
supra note 17, at 596-600. The Coastal court did not discuss equitable estoppel. In view of the
"epochal" importance of the sovereignty lands issue, 492 So. 2d at 344, a litigant should not be
sanguine as to his chances of prevailing against the Trustees on equitable estoppel grounds.
180. We use "declares" in the Blackstonian sense of announcing the common law as it is
now and always has been. If one views Coastal as sub silentio overruling contrary case law established
in Odom, the correct verb is "creates."
181. Conversely, the title searcher may be unable to determine whether the state has any
claim at all to a currently navigable waterbody.
182. See Coastal, 492 So. 2d at 349.
183. This is one of the goals of the legislation proposed in this article. See infra text at S IX

(Proposed Legislation).
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VI.

EXISTENCE AND SCOPE OF SOVEREIGNTY LANDS

A.

Navigability

Navigability is the threshold issue. Unless the waters were navigable when
Florida became a state in 1845, the state has no claim to ownership of the
submerged bottoms. Two facets of the navigability issue must be addressed
separately. First, one must determine the applicable rules of law. Only then is
it appropriate to address the special evidentiary problems and factual ambiguities
likely to be encountered in the application of the rules of law.
1. The Navigability-in-Fact Doctrine
The United States Supreme Court took the lead in the nineteenth century
in defining navigable waterways. The issue arose in three different contexts:
first, the existence of federal admiralty jurisdiction; second, the respective rights
of the federal and state governments to regulate under the commerce clause;
and third, the ownership issue involved here. The Court developed slightly
differing tests of navigability for each of these three areas. "4 The most commonly-quoted test for title comes from The Daniel Ball:'"
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which
are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are
used or are susceptible of being used in their ordinary condition, as
highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel over water. I'"
In short, the controlling test is whether, on March 3, 1845,"1 a river was
susceptible of use (actual use is unnecessary) "for commerce" by a "customary
mode of trade and travel."'' "
The "customary mode" element of the test is subject to some controversy.
Commercial log floatage and/or recreational boating have been suggested as
184. &e MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law: Historical Devdopment,
Current Importance, and Somt Doctrines That Don't Hold Water, 3 FA. ST. U.L. REv. 511, 587-605

(1975).
185.

77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).

186. Id. at 563. Although The Daniel Ball was an admiralty case, its definition of navigability
has been adopted in subsequent Supreme Court title cases. See MacGrady, supra note 184, at 592.
187. Navigability for title purposes is tested on the date of a state's admission to the union.

Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1971).
188. MacGrady, supra note 184, at 592. The test enunciated in The Daniel Ball includes four
important elements:
First, it is not necessary for the water body to have ever been used for navigation; it
is sufficient for the water body to be "susceptible" to navigation. Secondly, it is not
susceptibility to any type of navigation that will render the water body navigable; but
rather, the water body must be susceptible to navigation "for commerce." Thirdly, the
water body must be susceptible to navigation for commerce in its "natural and ordinary
condition," although navigability will not be destroyed by "occasional difficulties in navigation." Fourthly, the commercial navigation can be by any "customary mode" of trade
or travel.
Id. at 592-93 (quoting The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 557).
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extreme examples of shallow draft "customary modes" of navigation. "" The
test, however, must be applied at the time of statehood,"'" and, therefore, a
recreational boating test is anachronistic. Even a traditional interpretation of
the customary mode test involves some difficult issues, such as identifying the
customary modes of commercial water travel in Florida (or possibly in surrounding states) in 1845, determining the draft of these vessels, and assessing
the weight courts should give to evidence of canopies of riparian vegetation
which would tend to obstruct commercial navigation on rivers having a sufficient
depth to otherwise support commerce.
2.

Evidentiary Issues

At the outset, a trial court will confront the rebuttable presumption that
non-meandered waterbodies are non-navigable."" The sovereignty claimant has
the burden of introducing credible evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of
navigability.19 2 This evidence will likely consist of three basic types.
a.

Navigability Today

Suppose the Conch River (a hypothetical river subject to a sovereignty lands
dispute) is navigable today, in the sense that everyone agrees that the customary
1845 commercial vessel could comfortably ply the length of the river. The
present condition of the river would be logically relevant evidence. The court
must then evaluate whether present navigability has resulted from dredging,
channeling or other artificial means occurring between March 3, 1845, and the
date of the trial. Conversely, if the Conch River were non-navigable today,
the deedholder would seek to offer this as evidence of non-navigability in 1845.
In this situation, the court must evaluate evidence offered by the sovereignty
claimant as to the artificial lowering of the water level since statehood.
Presumably, relatively few Florida waterbodies have not been either dredged,
or lowered, or possibly both, since statehood. The trial court, therefore, will
face the possibility that this small phase of the trial will turn into a detailed
150 year history of the Conch River, with evidence of the 1897 dredging being
countered by evidence of the 1912 diversion for irrigation and a general lowering

189. See MacGrady, supra note 184, at 593 ("Under such a view there would not be many
non-navigable streams for title purposes in the United States") (citing cases); seealso Bucki v.
Cone, 25 Fla. 1, 19-20, 6 So. 160, 162 (1889) (unclear whether log floatage showed navigability
for title purposes or merely an easement over the waters: "And this fact of commercial importance
... furnishes the ground upon which the private rights of owners of the bed of a river are made
subject to the right of way in the public.").
190. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9 (1971). The Odom court specifically rejected the
recreational boating test on similar grounds. Odom, 341 So. 2d at 986.
191. The presumption is stated in Odom, 341 So. 2d at 989. This facet of Odom probably
survives the Coastal decision. See Coastal, 492 So. 2d at 342 n.J. The correlative presumption meandered waterbodies are presumptively navigable - will generally not be involved since a meander line appears on the face of the chain of title, and has generally been treated as nearly conclusive
evidence of navigability. Id. at 988-89.
192. See FLA. STAT. SS 90.302(1) & 90.303 (1985).
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of all water levels.1 Faced with the prospect of drowning in a collateral issue,
the trial court will probably rule that the present condition should be given
little weight, or perhaps, not admitted at all."'14
b.

Ancient Documents

The sovereignty claimant would introduce any available sketches, phiotographs, diaries or the like which would tend to prove commerce was actually
conducted on the river. The availability of such ancient records seems largely
a matter of serendipity. The ancient records, if found at all, would probably
not reflect the state of affairs on March 3, 1845. The process of compensating
for post-statehood, pre-document changes to the waterbody described above would
still be necessary, but obviously to a lesser extent the older the document.'"
c.

Indirect Proof by Experts

The sovereignty claimant could offer the following sequence of proof: (i)
our first group of experts will establish the location of an historic OHWL along
the banks of the Conch; (ii) if a series of horizontal lines were drawn from
OHWL to OHWL, the resulting plane would describe the position of the historic, natural surface of the Conch; (iii) this plane is x feet higher than the
mean elevation of the existing river bottom (technically this technique would
require a determination of the "then existing" river bottom) demonstrating that
the Conch was x feet deep; (iv) our second group of experts will then testify
that a customary vessel of commerce in 1845 had a draft of y feet; (v) x is
greater than y; therefore, (vi) the Conch River was navigable-in-fact under the
federal title test.
Although navigability vel non is logically the threshold question, the indirect
mode of proof draws in the secondary question of the OHWL location. The
deedholder faced with a proffer of this indirect proof must evaluate the transaction costs of defending his title. Two separate costs are involved, the cost of
litigating the navigability issue, and the cost of proving the location of the
boundary line, assuming that he loses on navigability. The boundary line issue
is costly because it requires extensive expert testimony. If a claimant can defend
on the navigability issue without the cost of hiring experts on the OHWL issue,
his anticipated transaction costs are approximately $100,000. If he must hire

193. The history-of-a-river scenario might be inevitable even if the trial court ruled today's
condition inadmissible. Very similar evidence would be heard on the location of the natural OHWL.

See infra text accompanying notes 197-204.
194. A trial court might find that the probative value of today's condition is substantially
outweighed by the dangers of confusion of issues or prejudicial impact. FLA. STAT. S 90.403 (1985).
195. One of the few readily and consistently available documents from that era will be the
field notes maintained by the original government surveyors (on file in the Archives of the Department of Natural Resources, Tallahassee). These records contain exacting measurements of the
width of a waterbody at the points it crosses sections lines and frequently include descriptions of
the surrounding terrain. These records are thus relevant to support the surveyor's decision not to
meander and as to the issue of the water level in the late 1800's.
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experts in order to try the case, his transaction costs might double.'H" A trial
court's early ruling on whether evidence of the location of a historic, natural
OHWL is admissible on the issue of navigability will likely have a profound
effect on the future course of sovereignty lands disputes.
B.

The Scope of the Sovereignty Claim: Locating the Natural OHWL

The scope of the sovereignty claim cannot be fixed by reference to property
descriptions in a document of title. Once navigability is established, the case
becomes a boundary line dispute. Under the common law the OHWL is the
critical boundary. The sovereign's claim (if any) extends only to the OHWL;
the deedholder's title extends upland from the OHWL. At first blush, then,
one would assume that the sovereignty claim is limited to the submerged lands
and the adjacent bit of shoreline up to the point where "the presence and
action of the water are so common and usual, [that it causes a] mark upon
the soil."'19

7

If the sovereignty claimant wanted only this bit of land, it is

doubtful that the sovereignty lands issue would be of general interest.
The sovereignty claimants in the reported cases have not been content with
an adjacent bit of shoreline. They have invoked two separate bases for expansion
of their claim to lands well beyond today's common law OHWL. These bases
are the common law rule that avulsive changes do not shift ownership, and a
subtle redefinition of how the OHWL itself is determined.
1. Avulsive Changes
A deedholder's boundary is not static. Moving water carries particles of
mud, sand, and sediment which may be deposited along one bank of a river.
As the sediment gradually builds up, the riparian owner finds more physical
land between himself and the water. Title to land formed by this process of
accretion vests in the deedholder. Land adjacent to waterbodies may also be
extended by the gradual and natural lowering of the water level. Title to land
exposed by this process of reliction also inures to the benefit of the deedholder.
Natural forces sometimes drive the water in the other direction. The riparian
owner loses title to land by the natural processes of erosion. The effect of each
196. See DNR Cost Memo, supra note 8.
197. Tilden v. Smith, 94 Fla. 502, 512-13, 113 So. 708, 712 (1927). In T/ien, the court went
to great lengths to clarify the line of demarcation, quoting in full the definition it adopted from
the Minnesota Supreme Court:
[High-water mark, as a line between a riparian owner and the public, is to be determined
by examining the bed and banks, and ascertaining where the presence and action of the
water are so common and usual, and so long continued in all ordinary years, as to mark
upon the soil of the bed a character distinct from that of the banks, in respect to vegetation,
as well as respects the nature of the soil itself. "High-water mark" means what its language
imports - a water mark. It is co-ordinate with the limit of the bed of the water; and
that only is to be considered the bed which the water occupies sufficiently long and continuously to wrest it from vegetation, and destroy its value for agricultural purposes.
Id. at 512-13, 113 So. 2d at 712 (quoting Carpenter v. Board of Comm'rs, 56 Minn. 513, 522,
58 N.W. 295, 297 (1894)). This definition was largely adopted from Howard v. Ingersoll, 54 U.S.
(13 How.) 379, 427 (1851) (Curtis, J., concurring).
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of these natural processes, accretion, reliction, and erosion, is to change the
OHWL and, thus, the boundary between the land owned by the sovereign and
that held by the deedholder.' 98
A vastly different rule, the rule that avulsive changes do not affect land
boundaries, applies to sudden or artificial changes affecting the OHWL. The
cutting of a new river channel by a single flood usually will not affect existing
land boundaries,'1 and the doctrine of reliction will generally not apply to shift
title to land exposed where the water level is artificially lowered..2 " ' For example,
suppose that the Conch River is and has always been undisputably navigable.
The Trustees hold title to the submerged lands and to that strip of exposed
land up to the OHWL. The Conch River suddenly changes course and exposes
1,000 acres of previously submerged lands. Because the change was avulsive,
the Trustees retain title to this 1,000 acres of now exposed land. Or, viewed
another way, title to this land does not inure to the benefit of the private
2
landowners whose land used to abut the Conch River. "

Changes falling into the "sudden natural" category are fairly easy to identify and apply at the time they occur. These changes are obvious in the truest
sense of the word. Moreover, courts are well equipped to contemporaneously
resolve the issue of suddenness, as witnesses can be found to give first hand
testimony. A retrospective determination, looking back over 150 years, is not
as easy for the court. There are usually no live witnesses whose testimony
would help clarify where the historic OHWL lay or by what physical process
the alleged changes occurred. The issue is likely to be resolved either by anecdotal evidence in ancient diaries, maps or surveyor's field notes or, more
likely, (and less reliably) by a battle of expert witnesses.
The waters are even murkier when the question is one of causation. Even
with the luxury of a contemporaneous determination, so many factors interact
in such a complex fashion that determining whether and to what extent a change
in the OHWL is attributable to artificial causes is all but impossible. The
problem becomes truly unmanageable in situations where the courts are asked
to determine whether and to what extent alleged changes in the OHWL over
the last 150 years were caused by artificial factors. Yet, it is this retrospective
determination with which the courts are faced in Coastal and which they will
face in future sovereignty lands cases.
Sovereignty claimants will argue that, although they can determine the OHWL
today, the determination is meaningless. At the time of statehood, the waterbody
may have been far larger and extended hundreds of yards beyond the present
OHWL. The Trustees' title extended out to the original OHWL as of the date
of statehood. Because the waterbody's shrinkage was the result of artificial drain-

198.

5A G.

THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY S

2560 (Repl.

1978).
199. State v. Florida Nat'l Propertics, Inc., 338 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1976).
200. Id.; seealso State Dep't of Natural Resources v. Contemporary Land Sales, Inc., 400
So. 2d 488 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1981); Padgett v. Central & S. Fla. Flood Control Dist., 178 So.
2d 900 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1965).

201.

See Broward v. Mabry, 58 Fla. 398, 50 So. 826 (1909).
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age or other avulsive changes, the Trustees' title now includes a strip of land
hundreds of yards wide running along both sides of the riverbed.
In Coastal, the Trustees alleged three separate categories of first-order artificial change: (1) the extensive ground water withdrawal by phosphate companies in surrounding areas, 21 2 (2) elimination of some fifty square miles of
tributary drainage area upriver, and (3) installation of dams on a series of lakes
21 °3
These first-order arguwhich control flow into the upriver collection areas.
ments are expected to be typical for any sovereignty lands dispute. Because of
the complexity of these arguments and the expense of the expert testimony
required to explain their significance and magnitude, the average riparian deedholder may be unable to defend title effectively against a well-funded sovereignty
claimant.
Amazingly the changes alleged in Coastal only scratch the surface. The case
law has set no proximate cause type bounds for second-order contributing factors
which might plausibly be raised by imaginative and well-funded litigants. For
example, they may argue that increased water pumping from the Green Swamp
in northern Polk County lowered the Floridan aquifer, thus lowering the water
levels in Lake Hancock and the Peace River. The same argument could be
made regarding pumping farther north in Lake City and in the Okeefenokee
Swamp. Parties may also question the impact of the incomplete Cross Florida
Barge Canal on the aquifer. The potential factors are limited only by the
endurance of the courts and the aggressiveness and imagination of the party bearing the burden of proof.
Because the courts decided most prior sovereignty lands cases on summary
grounds, or years ago when artificial changes were few and the methods of
proof less reliable, the body of law of causation is not well developed. The
Coastal decision will likely force courts to articulate a proximate cause-like standard to limit the arguments. The only conclusion one can draw is that in a
state where over 20 million acres were determined to be "more wet than dry,"
acquired as S&O lands, 20 4 and subsequently sold to be drained and improved,
uncertainty will persist as to the applicable OHWL. Proofs of the historic OHWL
are staggering in their complexity and expense and the outcomes uncertain.
2.

Redefining the OHWL

The second way a sovereignty claimant may expand the scope of his claim
is by arguing for a subtle redefinition of the manner in which the OHWL is

202. The Trustees alleged that this practice lowers the pressure (potentiometric surface) in the
aquifer system, leading to sinkhole formation and a reduction in the flow of ground water into

lakes and the river. See Trustees' Memorandum of Law on the Issue of Reliction at 3-4, Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Coastal Petroleum Co., No. TCA 79-1082 (N.D. Fla. May 6, 1982) [hereinafter
cited as Trustees' Reliction Memo].
203. Id. In response, Mobil pointed out that for the past 20 years, Central Florida has experienced a dramatic reduction in rainfall and that this has had an impact on groundwater levels.

Mobil Oil Corp.'s Response to the Trustees' Memorandum of Law on the Issue of Reliction at
5, No. TCA 79-1082 (N.D. Fla. May 6, 1982).
204. See BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 29, at 26.
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determined..3 5 As evidenced by their assertions, 2' 6 the Trustees are not attempting a clean break from the common law definition, but rather are arguing
that the historic OHWL is so obscured by the passage of time that evidence
other than a physical "mark" is necessary.
Like the determination of which changes are natural, the question of how
to determine the OHWL raises a host of secondary issues. Tilden v. Smith2

7

is

the only Florida appellate court decision which addresses the issue of determining
the OHWL. That court adopted the definition contained in the United States
Supreme Court case of Howard v. Ingersoll.3" Both cases set forth a "look for
a mark" standard:
[Hligh-water mark, as a line between a riparian owner and the public,
is to be determined by examining the bed and banks, and ascertaining
where the presence and action of the water are so common and usual,
and so long continued in all ordinary years, as to mark upon the soil
of the bed a character distinct from that of the banks, in respect to
vegetation, as well as respects the nature of the soil itself. 9 "High-water
mark" means what its language imports-a water mark.'
The "look for a mark" standard is ill-suited for determining old marks. It
also fails to establish which of the several possible marks are relevant. The term
"ordinary," itself, has several potential interpretations. It could mean the average
ordinary high water level, or alternatively, the highest water level water point
reached in an "ordinary" year.2 *' That difference may be significant. Notwithstanding the admonition in Tilden that "the high-water mark . . . is not

the highest point to which the stream rises in times of freshets, "233 the Trustees
in Coastal claimed that the OHWL extends past a cypress swamp to the upland
edge of an area of mixed hardwoods alleged (prior to avulsive changes) to have
2" 2
been affected by the river's waters only two months a year.
The language in Tilden suggests a two-part physical state test: look for a

205. A facial redefinition of OHWL would raise taking claims. If the deedholder owned a
parcel of land extending to a line and the state redefined the term so that the boundary was 100
feet further from the river, a compensable taking would occur. A more subtle change in how the
OHWL is determined, even though it accomplishes the same result, is less likely to be successfully
challenged, especially since the location of the historic OHWL may today be wholly obscured.
206. Trustees' Trial Brief, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Coastal Petroleum Co., No. TCA 79-1082
(N.D. Fla. May 6, 1982).
207. 94 Fla. 502, 113 So. 708 (1927).

208. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 379 (1851).
This line is to be found by examining the bed and banks, and ascertaining where the

presence and action of water are so common and usual, and so long continued in all
ordinary years, as to mark upon the soil of the bed a character distinct from that of the
banks, in respect to vegetation, as well as in respect to the nature of the soil itself.
Id. at 427 (Curtis, J., concurring).
209. 94 Fla. at 512, 113 So. at 712.
210. The latter would seemingly coincide with the annual flood levels.
211.

94 Fla. at 512-13, 113 So. at 712 (quoting Dow v. Electric Co., 69 N.H. 198, 498, 45

A. 350, 351 (1899)).
212.

Trustees' Trial Brief, supra note 206, at 6.
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mark "in respect to vegetation, as well as respects the nature of the soil itself."1213 It further stated "[it is co-ordinate with the limit of the bed of the
water; and that only is to be considered the bed which the water occupies
sufficiently long and continuously to wrest it from vegetation, and destroy its
value for agricultural purposes. 2 14 This language opens the path for a whole
new line of analysis. It allows for consideration of the vegetation along the
river as a separate means of determining the OHWL, and potentially for a
sovereignty claimant to expand the scope of sovereignty lands.
This line of argument also raises a host of questions unanswered in Florida
jurisprudence. For example, what type of vegetative impact is required? Tilden
refers to both "wrest[ing] it from vegetation, '215 suggestive of an absence of
terrestrial vegetation test,21 6 and "preventing the growth of vegetation constituting an ordinary agricultural crop, ' 21 7 which would suggest some vegetation
below OHWL is permissible. 2 8 If the former test is adopted, the resulting line
will likely deviate little from the existing OHWL..2 1 9 If the latter test is adopted,
the question becomes one of the type of agricultural use the land must be
capable of supporting.
Here again, a plethora of separate issues is raised. If "an ordinary agricultural crop" is the standard ,221 what is "ordinary"? Is this a local crop
standard? Would ordinary crop include crops that thrive in wet areas, such as
rice or sugar cane, or should it, as is hinted by the Trustees, be limited to
crops that don't like to get their feet wet? Does the presence of trees suggest
agricultural potential? What about the potential for growing seasonal crops during the dry season?22 ' Does the grazing of cattle constitute an ordinary agri22 2

cultural use?

213. Tilden, 94 Fla. at 512-13, 113 So. at 712. The nature of the soil test includes consideration
of factors such as erosion, shelving, changes in the character of the soil and accumulated litter.
See, e.g., United States v. Cameron, 466 F. Supp. 1099, 1112 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
214. Tilden, 94 Fla. at 512-13, 113 So. at 712.

215. Id.
216. Several courts have interpreted the test as requiring no terrestrial vegetation. See, e.g.,
United States v. Chicago B. & Q. R.R., 90 F.2d 161, 170 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 714
(1937) (action of water sufficient to "destroy vegetation"); see also Borough of Ford City v. United
States, 345 F.2d 645, 648 (3d Cir. 1965); Harrison v. Fite, 148 F. 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1906);
Goose Creek Hunting Club, Inc. v. United States, 518 F.2d 579, 583 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
217. Tilden, 94 Fla. at 512-13, 113 So. at 712.
218. Other courts conclude that the presence or absence of vegetation is not conclusive on the
issue of agricultural suitability. See, e.g., State v. Sorenson, 222 Iowa 1248, 1251, 271 N.W. 234,
236 (1937).
219. The Trustees admitted that the adoption of the absence-of-terrestrial-vegetation test would

"substantially eliminate the Trustees' conversion claims." Trustees' Trial Brief, supra note 206, at
12.
220. Tilden, 94 Fla. at 512-13, 113 So. at 712.
221. This became a relevant inquiry in Coastal because the Trustees admitted a portion of the
land claimed was dry ten months of the year. Trustees' Trial Brief, supra note 206, at 6.
222. Compare Goose Creek Hunting Club, Inc. v. United States, 518 F.2d 579, 584 (Ct. Cl.
1975) (holding cattle are sufficient) with Heckman Ranches, Inc. v. State, 99 Idaho 793, 799, 589
P.2d 540, 546 (1979) (holding cattle irrelevant to the condition of the land).
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This article offers no guidance on the issue of what factors should be considered in determining an historic OHWLo only the caveat that the courts should
be on their guard against spurious causal relations being offered as proof. The
presence of cypress and other water-adapted species does not prove the extent
of the river. Similarly, the absence of past agrarian use does not prove the
land is unfit for agriculture.2 3 This further illustrates the tremendous difficulty
224
in determining an historic high water mark.
In practice, these two logically distinct arguments, soil condition and vegetation, will be intertwined. The process of establishing the "original" OHWL
will involve latent assumptions by the sovereignty claimant's experts, the effect
of which is to peg the OHWL at the most remote point where it can be argued
that the flora or geologic deposits show signs that the water once exerted influence.
This potential for expanding the scope of the sovereignty claimant's claim
is the crux of the sovereignty lands issue. It shifts the controversy from the
almost academic question of who owns the naked fee interest beneath rivers
and ponds, 225 to the intensely pragmatic question of who owns the land lying
hundreds of yards upland from the present OHWL. This creates a zone of
ambiguity surrounding title to all riparian lands in this state. Deedholders with
deeds absolute on their face, who have cultivated and improved their land and
who have paid property taxes on the land and improvements for decades, are
affected because there is simply no basis for predicting the actual extent of
sovereignty lands. While notions of fairness may weigh against the sovereignty
claimant when a claim is made in opposition to a deedholder as to "high and
dry" lands,1' property law, rather than abstract notions of fairness, will de223. The Trustees' Trial Brief, supra note 206, at 13, makes this logical error.
224. Arguments also exist in favor of other methods of determination. See United States v.
Cameron, 466 F. Supp. 1099, 1112 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (permitting the use of water stage and

elevation data).
225. The issue is not purely academic because the owner of the bottomlands can extract user
fees, building fees, access charges and other fiscal benefits from the adjacent riparian owner.
226. This deedholder derived title from a clean patent or deed out. The deedholder and his
predecessors in title likely received professional assurance that title was secure. Indeed, the land
may not border on any water. Yet title is in peril if an expert employed by a sovereignty claimant
finds evidence that some nearby body of water once reached - even at flood stages - the contested
land.
A recent edition of the monthly newsletter of Attorneys' Title Insurance Fund, Inc. set forth

some guidelines which they, as title insurers, believe should be followed:
1.If a current inspection of the property or survey reveals no bodies of water or
streams and the original government survey shows no meandered body of water, then it
may be presumed that the property is free of the sovereignty lands claim. No exception
need be made in a Fund policy.
2. If a current survey or inspection shows a lake or large pond but the original gov-

ernment survey shows no meandered body of water, then determination should be made
of the size of the lake. If the lake is smaller than 120 acres, then it is doubtful that the
state would make a sovereignty lands claim. No exception need be made in a Fund policy.
3. If a current inspection or survey reveals a small lake or pond and the original
government survey shows a meandered small lake, then the lands lying beneath the ordinary

high-water mark should be treated as sovereignty lands and excluded from coverage under
a policy.
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termine the claim. To this spate of problems, three possible solutions exist:
resolution by the judiciary on a case-by-case basis, administrative (executive
branch) fixes, or resolution through legislation. This article will next examine
each of these potential solutions.
VII.

SOLUTIONS TO THE SOVEREIGNTY LANDS PROBLEM

A. Judicial Solution
At present the only route open to the deedholder is to seek to quiet title
against the state." 7 After the decision in Coastal, the determination of state
ownership requires an initial determination of whether a given waterbody was

in fact navigable on the date of statehood, and if navigable, where the OHWL
would fall but for avulsive changes. Both of these determinations, by their very
nature, will require fact-intensive proofs of ancient history. Twentieth century
judges and juries, accustomed to the luxury of live testimony by persons with
first-hand knowledge, are not well equipped to deal with these types of issues.
In addition to the inherent difficulties of proof, leaving this problem to
judicial resolution creates a number of frightening possibilities. Among these
22
possibilities are the further clogging of an already overloaded court system, "
4. If a current survey and inspection reveals a stream located on the property, it should
be determined where the stream terminates. If the stream terminates into a river, a meandered lake or body of water or a lake of more than 120 acres, then the stream should
be treated as subject to a potential claim of sovereignty lands and a disclaimer requested
out of the state through the Department of Natural Resources. If the stream terminates
in an unmeandered lake of less than 120 acres, the stream may be treated as nonnavigable.
5. If a current survey or inspection reveals that lands are near a navigable body of
water, it should be requested that the surveyor locate on the survey the original government
meader line and the current ordinary high-water mark (fresh water) or mean high-tide line
(salt water). . . . Based on this information, if the surveyor advises that lands are upland
of both the original government meander line and the current water boundary line, then
there is no problem. If the lands lie on the water side of the original government meander
line but are upland of the current ordinary high-water mark or mean high tide [line] and
there has been no fill, this presents no problem. If the lands are waterward of the original
government meander line and there is evidence of filling, a disclaimer should be obtained
from the Department of Natural Resources or an exception made in the policy for the
filled-in lands.
Guttman, Claims of State Sovereignty Lands - Pandora's Box Opened?, 18 THE FUND CONcEPT 65, 7273 (1986).
Although potentially helpful, these guidelines fail to recognize that the OHWL prior to avulsive
change, rather than the current OHWL, governs. The pre-avulsive OHWL may lie a great distance
upland of the current OHWL. This hiatus must concern the title examiner. As shown in Coastal,
lands lying completely upland of any body of water may be subject to sovereignty lands claims.
Guidelines 1, 3 and 5 each suffer from this deficiency. The choice of 120 acres as the cut-off in
guideline 2 is also surprising since Odom and Coastal both referred to ponds of 140 acres, which
is itself smaller than the ponds at issue in Odom. Ste supra note 149.
227. A state agency's denial of a permit based on a sovereignty lands claim will likely trigger
most early cases.
228. DNR has estimated that there are 11,900 running miles of river, with an average of ten
ownerships per mile; 611 lakes larger than 150 acres, each of which has an average of ten riparian
owners; and 3125 lakes between 25 and 150 acres, each of which has an average of five riparian
owners. DNR Cost Memo, supra note 8. Therefore, a group of 140,735 potential litigants exists.
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manipulation by state agencies which may selectively grant or deny permits on
sovereignty grounds, 219 inconsistent judicial decisions"" and standards for determination, and prohibitive litigation costs for both DNRZ: " and private deedholders. 22
B.

Executive Solution

The option of an executive branch solution is also tenuous, given the strict
bifurcation of entities implicit in Coastal. If the Trustees in the nineteenth century could not determine navigability and have that determination bind the
state, 2 " DNR certainly cannot do so today. As title to sovereignty lands is now
vested in the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund, '2 3 4 it would seem that
the Trustees could independently resolve the problem. Their efforts to do so
would require a determination that vesting title to formerly submerged lands
If only 25% of these sought judicial determination of land boundaries and confirmation of title,
Florida courts will be inundated with 40,194 new cases.
These calculations do not consider the potential claims of non-riparian deedholders, who may
nonetheless be subject to sovereignty lands clouds. Another possibility, perhaps even likelihood, is
that banks and title insurers will begin requiring quiet title actions or state disclaimers on all
riparian parcels as a prerequisite to new mortgages and title insurance. Both these factors have
the potential to expand the caseload.
229. Given the proscriptions of FLA. CoNsr. art. X, 5 11, and Coastal's strict separation of
entities within state government, the issuance of a permit will not serve either to confirm title or
to preclude a subsequent sovereignty lands claim.
230. Judges are not likely to rule consistently on the issue of navigability, and it is even less
likely that consistent decisions on the issue of OHWL would result. Consider two neighboring
deedholders, Smith and Jones, each having riparian rights on the same river. Each brings a quiet
title action. Their cases are assigned to different judges. Imagine the confusion if the judge in
Smith's case ruled that the OHWL, as adjusted for avulsive change, was at one point, while the
other judge ruled that Jones' OHWL was lower. A worse scenario would result if the judges
delivered inconsistent decisions on the issue of navigability; the river was navigable in front of the
Smiths' home but not in front of the Jones' house. The potential for such discrepancies exists
between judges of the same county, although, over time, one would hope that they would come
to rely on prior rulings concerning the same river. Realistically, discrepancies would probably occur
only in contemporaneous cases. A much greater potential for inconsistency exists if Smith and
Jones live on different sides of the county line, so that jurisdiction would liein two different circuit
courts.
231. Sovereignty lands litigation is staggeringly expensive. By 1982, the state had spent $3
million in legal fees in Coastal's federal court litigation, and sought an emergency appropriation of
5800,000 to fund the anticipated trial. S. Miller, supra note 129.
During the sovereignty lands controversy, DNR estimated that the costs of defending ownership
(without MRTA as a means of summary disposition) would total almost $1 billion. DNR Cost
Memo, supra note 8. Given the political atmosphere in which it was prepared, one suspects that
this estimate is skewed toward the high end. It is predicated on the assumption that every case
would go through trial and one appeal. Moreover, the number of miles of rivers is based on an
estimate which includes "sloughfs], bayou[s], hollow[s], for prong[s], head[s] as well as . . .riveris],
creekjs], branch[es], brook[s], [and] run[s]." Id. Clearly, many of these smaller waterbodies could,
and should, be disclaimed by DNR without trial.
232. Private landowners are "one shot players," and will not gain from their experiences and
the opportunity to place experts on staff. Accordingly, their litigation costs are expected to be higher
than those of the state.
233. Coastal, 492 So. 2d at 342-44.
234. FLA. STAT. 5 253.03 (1985).
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in the riparian owners was in the public interest.2 5 The Trustees now have
the authority to issue the appropriate deeds. The only question is whether the
Trustees are empowered to make the required determination of the public interest. The logistics of actual deed preparation and delivery are a separate
concern. Without legislative approval of an alternative conveyancing method,
present law would require individual conveyances.
C.

Legislative Solutions

1. Ability and Constraints
Given the inability of the judiciary to expediently fashion an appropriate
and workable solution, and the questions concerning the executive's independent
ability to handle the problem, the duty logically falls to the legislature. The
legislature has the authority under the Florida Constitution, -"" and, because the
Trustees' title is one in trust,2 3 7 rather than in fee, title is not an impenetrable
barrier.
Ironically, prior to the Coastal decision, the legislature was less able to deal
comprehensively with the sovereignty lands problem. There was a significant
danger that proposed legislative solutions would either emasculate MRTA, thus
calling into question all existing land titles which had previously relied on it,2
or be an unconstitutional taking, immediately triggering huge numbers of taking
claims and a run on the state treasury.
Since Coastal, the risk of legislative action emasculating MRTA so as to call
into question significant numbers of Florida's land titles has been reduced. So
too has the need to risk an unconstitutional taking. If, as the Coastal court held,
the state still owns all sovereignty lands, there is neither the need nor the
incentive to begin litigation to reacquire sovereignty lands.
235. Id. S 253.001 (subjecting the Trustees to the requirements of FLA. CoNsT. art. X, S 11).
236. FLA. CoNsT. art. X, S 11 ("Sale of such lands may be authorized by law") (emphasis added).
237. FLA. STAT. S 253.001 (1985).
238. In its Final Report, the MRTA Commission proposed a bill which would have amended
section 712.04 of the Florida Statutes to express the intent of the 1963 Legislature and to effectively
reverse the Odom court's interpretation of the law. See FINAL REPoRT, supra note 72, at 53-d to

53-f. If the legislature could amend or repeal MRTA at any time, a title examiner would never
be able to rely on MRTA to clear title. Even if MRTA was effective to clear title today, the law
would be subject to amendment in the future. In light of such a risk, the careful practitioner would
be forced to advise against reliance on MRTA in favor of complete title examinations and the
clearing of all potential claims.
Equally problematic is the Report's proposed legislative determination of navigability and extent
of a given waterbody in 1845. See id. at 53-j, 53-1. Under the report, the 1986 legislature would

have declared that portions of Lake Okeechobee, meandered by the federal surveyors and determined
in Martin v. Busch to have been sovereignty lands, really were not navigable in 1845. Land titles
are not very stable in an environment in which a contemporary legislature may rewrite history in
this fashion. If they could do so in 1986, what would prevent further revisionist histories in 1988,
1990 or any time thereafter? Also, the proposed legislative determination would abandon the state's
claims to some state lands. The question would then arise whether the abandonment would be
effective under article X, section 11 of the Florida Constitution without an express finding of the
public interest.
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This is not to say that there are no longer any constraints on legislative
solutions; there are. These constraints include both of the above considerations
and the constitutional restriction on disposition of sovereignty lands unless done
in the public interest. 239 The sub-issues surrounding property ownership and
the very real need to confirm private land titles are clear. Recognizing the
unsatisfactory state of the post-Coastal status quo, and the need to clarify land
title, the remainder of this article is premised on the need for a legislative
solution. The article will discuss the various interests of the state and the individual deedholders, and then summarize the legislative solution being proposed
and the considerations which underlie its phrasing.
2.

The State's Interests

On close examination, it would seem that the state has essentially four
concerns in the sovereignty lands arena. The first is the interest of the people
in having access to waterbodies for fishing, boating, and other recreational
purposes. This interest is beyond dispute and constitutionally sanctified.4 " During the course of the MRTA controversy, this interest, to the exclusion of
others, has been stressed in the political debate. Unfortunately, in the heat of
battle, the quality of debate on this important concern denigrated into emotive
terms and inaccurate analyses. These tactics, while generating public support,
disguised the actual issues.241 The people's interest in access to waterways is
fully satisfied by state ownership of existing navigable waterways, perhaps with
a narrow strip of land on which canoeists can rest and picnic.
The state's second interest is in maintaining the stability of land values. As
discussed above, the individual deedholder's title is clouded and the value of
his land diminished by the market's estimate of the cost of removing the cloud

239.

FLA. CONST. art. X, S 11.
Sovereignty lands. - The title to lands under navigable waters, within the boundaries
of the state, which have not been alienated, including beaches below mean high water
lines, is held by the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for all the people. Sale of
such lands may be authorized by law, but only when in the public interest. Private use
of such lands may be authorized by law, but only when not contrary to the public interest.

Id.
240. Id.
241. The classic argument was that unless courts recognized the state's claim to absolute
ownership of the disputed land, the public would be barred from using the waterway. This attempt
to frame the issue in absolute black-and-white terms might have been useful propaganda for attracting public enthusiasm to the cause, but it was an affront to one thousand years of AngloAmerican property law. The relevant inquiries should be what estates in the land various parties
own, and what their ownership of those estates means? Additionally, a court should ask who, by
virtue of any existing easements, equitable servitudes, and covenants running with the land, is
entitled to use the land without interference from anyone, including the "owner." Many years
prior to Coastal, the public trust doctrine negated this simplistic analysis by positing the existence
of an easement protecting the public's right to use waters and lands, especially coastal lands, up
to the OHWL. See, e.g., Gies v. Fischer, 146 So. 2d 361, 363 (Fla. 1962) (applying public trust
doctrine); State v. Black River Phosphate Co., 32 Fla. 82, 95, 13 So. 640, 644 (1893) (defining
the public trust doctrine). If a public easement or servitude exists, then the public's right to use
these waters and lands is secure, and ownership of the underlying fee is irrelevant.
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and of the less than perfect certainty of outcome. While directly impacting on
the deedholder, the state is also impacted in that a general decline in property
values results in a lower valuation for ad valorem tax purposes. Units of local
government can expect a decline in revenues, as would the state itself, since
documentary stamp taxes are tied to market values. Moreover, falling land
values have a generally corrosive effect on the middle class and correspondingly
on the level of overall economic activity, as is seen from the problems in the
midwest farm states. The situation would only be exacerbated if the people
perceived that the government was behind their declining land values. In the
sovereignty lands context, the state's interest is in confirming title to riparian
owners above some determinate line.
Florida's third interest is in the restriction of the development, misuse, spoilage and pollution of environmentally sensitive lakes, rivers, streams, and wetlands. The state has, and presently exercises, sufficient police powers to control
this risk. Fee ownership of lands above, or for that matter below, the existing
OHWL is irrelevant to the state's police power.
The fourth state interest is in increasing revenue to the state. The more
land the state can successfully claim as sovereignty land, the more income it
can generate, either through user and permit fees, or through actual resale of
the land. This revenue source is severely limited if only presently navigable
waters are claimed as sovereignty lands. If, however, lands hundreds of yards
from the existing OHWL are successfully claimed, the revenue potential is
tremendous. The lands potentially claimed include some of Florida's most valuable waterfront properties and personal residences, all of which were long
thought to be, and taxed as, private property. Were the state able to successfully
assert title to these lands, the Trustees could then resell them and use the
profit to fund government operations into the twenty-first century. While conceptually an interesting revenue source, such a funding scheme is neither equitable nor politically and pragmatically supportable.
Only the state's revenue interest supports the ownership claims to significant
expanses of land above the existing OHWL. The other goals can be fully
accomplished without such ownership. While maximizing government's non-tax
revenue is a goal that most taxpayers will abstractly support, this revenue source
and the means of collecting it are particularly distasteful and reflect an inherently
inappropriate state goal.
3.

The Proposed Legislation

This article is premised on the supposition that the Coastal decision leaves
the law and land titles in an undesirable state. The article has identified various
consequences and concerns to be addressed and now offers, in the form of a
proposed bill, a potential solution. The specific goals in drafting this proposed
legislation were to clearly define the boundary between sovereignty and privately
held lands, and to do so in a fashion which coincides with common understandings of the extent of state ownership; to confirm title in the uplands in
their respective owners, thus eliminating the sovereignty lands cloud on their
title; to confirm title to lands under currently navigable waters, but of uncertain
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1845 status, in the state; to stop the perceived DNR abuses of claiming an
exceedingly high OHWL and using that determination to generate income at
the expense of deedholders; and to do all of the above without constituting a
taking of property or running afoul of the constitutional restrictions on transferring sovereignty lands.
Under the proposed bill, DNR would be directed to catalog all lands in
which it claimed a sovereignty lands interest and to provide a surveyed legal
description for each.2 42 These materials would be submitted to the Trustees for
their review and approval.2 41 Upon the Trustees' approval, as submitted or as
modified, a "reverse MRTA" provision would be triggered.2 44 Under this provision, unless objection is filed within a specified time, the title to the areas
designated as being below the OHWL would be legislatively vested in the state.
Lands above the OHWL, together with a statutory riparian easement, would
be legislatively confirmed in the riparian owner. In order to survive constitutional scrutiny, the bill will provide a means of challenging determinations of
navigability and OHWL, and will provide relatively low cost and summary
methods of doing so.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Given the sales of S&O lands in the mid-nineteenth century and the failure
to designate and describe navigable waterways, a latent controversy over sovereignty lands has always been present in Florida. Relatively little avulsive or
artificial change in waterways occurred for almost a hundred years after statehood. Thus, the OHWL, as it existed then, was generally reflective of the
property boundary. Since the 1940's, man's ability and willingness to dredge,
fill, drain, and otherwise affect water tables has increased markedly, as has his
ability to measure the effects of such changes. These factors, in conjunction
with intensive residential use of small riparian plots, laid the groundwork for
the current sovereignty lands problems.
From the state's perspective, the problems came to a head when private
landowners began relying on MRTA246 to confirm their land titles. They relied,
built, and paid taxes on this property. The state, largely acting through DNR
began asserting claims to land which, although presently high and dry, were at

242. See Proposed Legislation S 1(3). These recommendations are incorporated in the Proposed
Legislation attached, infra text at S IX. This summary of the proposed bill is cross-referenced to
specific section numbers. Detailed comments concerning the considerations in drafting the legislation
have been included as footnotes to the bill itself.
243. Proposed Legislation S 1(4).
244. This is referred to as a "reverse MRTA" provision because the language of the Proposed
Legislation tracks the saving clause of the original MRTA provision in FuA. STAT. S 712.07 (1985)
and allows claimants to preserve unrecorded interests by filing.
245. Proposed Legislation §1(6)(a).
246. FLA. STAT. SS 712.01-.10 (1985). Much of this reliance was implicit because no suit .or
notice is required for claimants to rely on the provisions of MRTA. Their attorneys and title
examiners also relied on the conclusions of Odom that contemporaneous determination and estoppel
acted independently to confirm title.
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least arguably once submerged sovereignty lands. The Florida Supreme Court

held in Coastal that MRTA and the other summary bases of disposition
would not confirm title to sovereignty lands in a private deedholder. The
combination of expansive claims by DNR and the absence of summary bases
of title confirmation leave the private deedholder in an awkward position. The
landowners does not know whether the waterbody abutting his property was
navigable in 1845 or, assuming that it was navigable, the location of the line
between the property and sovereignty lands. Worse yet, a landowner has no efficient means of confirming title or of locating the OHWL which forms his property boundary.
Any judicial resolution must necessarily address the complex historic issues
of fact to determine: (1) whether the waterbody in question was, regardless of
its current state and condition, navigable on March 3, 1845; and (2) where
the OHWL would be had there been no avulsive changes since the date of
statehood. Both questions are extremely complex, requiring extensive and expensive evidentiary proofs. This issue touches all riparian lands in Florida, and
arguably even some non-riparian lands and raises the spectre of overwhelming
caseloads. This potential is accentuated still further by the possibility that banks
and title insurers will begin requiring quiet title actions as a prerequisite to new
mortgages or title policies. 247 Given Florida's already overburdened court
system, the judiciary is ill-equipped to deal with the problem. Legislative action
to confirm and articulate the state's interest in presently navigable waterways,
to delineate the boundary between sovereignty and privately held lands, and
to confirm title to the privately held uplands in the respective owners is urged.1

247. DNR claims the huge areas were navigable. See supra text accompanying notes 202-21.
DNR has indicated that it will soon begin compiling a listing of which waterbodies are navigable
and writing a book setting forth the proper principles and techniques to use in determining the
ordinary high water mark. While both are admirable undertakings, they will not remove the ambiguity surrounding property boundaries. An administrative listing of navigable waterbodies will
not be binding on future administrations, nor will it release state claims to waterbodies which may
subsequently be recharacterized navigable. Likewise, a book explaining how to determine the boundary line is utterly useless absent some method for binding the state to the private survey. Unless
the state can be bound, commissioning a private survey (other than in a litigation context) is a
waste of money. The same uncertainty still exists over where the boundary line falls. Long, Handbook
to Help Florida Define Lake, River Boundaries, The Orlando Sentinel, Sept. 25, 1986, at D14, col. 1.
Just prior to publication, of this article, the United States Supreme Court denied a petition
for a writ of certiorari in the Coastal case. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Board of Trustees, 107 S. Ct.
950 (1987).
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IX.

PROPOSED LEGISLATION

Declaration of Legislative Intent, Findings, and Purposes Whereas, in recognition of the uncertainty regarding precise ownership rights
as those rights relate to sovereignty lands, the legislature has determined that
there is a need for a comprehensive statutory provision dealing specifically with
that issue; and
Whereas, the purpose of this act is to determine ownership rights conclusively
by providing a definite and equitable procedure by which those rights shall be
established; and
Whereas, the legislature has determined this act and the vesting of title to
and rights in certain allegedly sovereignty lands are in the public interests; and
Whereas, the legislature's intent is that expressions of legislative purposes
contained in subsection (1)(0, (1)(i), (2), (6)(a), (11) and (14) of section 1 be particularly considered when applying or interpreting this act.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:
Section 1. Section 253.1201, Florida Statutes, is created to read:
(1) Definitions. For the purposes of this section:
(a) "Board of Trustees" means the Board of Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Trust Fund.
(b) "Department" means the Florida Department of Natural Resources.
(c) "Meandered waters" means those waterbodies of the state which were
meandered in an original United States government survey.
(d) "Ordinary high water line" means the ordinary high water line as
defined by common law and shall be determined by examifling the bed and
banks of a waterbody, and ascertaining where the presence and action of the
water are so common and usual, and so long continued in all ordinary years,
as to mark upon the soil of the bed a character distinct from that of the banks,
in respect to vegetation, as well as respects the nature of the soil itself 2 4s The
ordinary high water line shall be the ordinary high water line as it currently
exists, without adjustment for any changes, whether natural or artificial, occurring prior to the date of enactment.

248. This definition was adopted from Tilden v. Smith, 94 Fla. 502, 512-13, 113 So. 708,
712 (1927). Tilden states that the OHWL does not include the annual flood levels. The interpretation
sometimes set forth, that OHWL is the maximum level reached in an "ordinary year," is an
erroneous interpretation of the term and of T'ilden. The correct interpretation of OHWL is the
level ordinarily reached during the course of the year.
A great deal of discussion went into the drafting of this section. One of the early drafts proposed
using the "dynamic water line" as the line of demarcation between private and public ownership.
This standard has the advantage of ready application and easy determination, but it would cause
difficulties because it could be applied to privately-owned "swamp and overflowed lands." The use
of the dynamic water line would also yield undesired results during extreme flood conditions.
Technical trespasses could occur under a dynamic water line standard if a riparian owner used
lands lying beneath flood waters.
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(e) "Perfection date" means the earliest of the following dates:
(i) the date on which property is voluntarily conveyed to the state pursuant to subsection (7);
(ii) the expiration of the period for filing a notice of claim under subsection (8), if none is filed;
(iii) the expiration of the period for a claimant to file suit for an adjudication of ownership rights, if none is filed; or
(iv) the final disposition in favor of the state of the suit for an adjudication of ownership rights.
(f)"Public trust rights" means those rights to use the navigable waters
within this state for boating, fishing, bathing, and other commercial and recreational purposes secured to all persons by the public trust doctrine. These
public rights of use constitute an easement in navigable waters and a servitude
upon the underlying lands, which exist in perpetuity and may not be extinguished except when in the public interest.
(g) "Qualifying riparian landowner" means any person who:
(i) holds record title to lands lying adjacent to or including what are
arguably sovereignty lands; and
(ii) has, or whose predecessors in title have, paid ad valorem taxes on
such lands.2"4
(h) "Sovereignty lands deed" means a quitclaim deed granting all rights,
title, and interest of the riparian owner and full public trust rights in lands
designated navigable pursuant to subsections (3) and (4) to the Board of Trustees
of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund in trust for the state, reserving unto
the grantor only riparian rights as they may exist at law and the special riparian
easement as defined in subsection (1)(i).
(i) "Special riparian easement" means a vested perpetual easement in a
submerged fee and in the water standing above it. Such easement is appurtenant
to and inseparable from the upland riparian fee. Such easement shall entitle
the riparian landowner to make any use of the lands and waters that would
be permissible for a person holding valid title to lands under navigable waters,
provided such use does not substantially impair or interfere with the public's
use of the waters pursuant to the public trust rights, and does not violate then
existing land use controls or regulatory restrictions of general applicability. Per-

249. The authors also considered denying the benefits of the special riparian easement and
confirmation of upland title to persons who challenged a determination of navigability under subsection 8. A prior definition of "qualifying riparian landowner" included a subsection (iii) which
read: "has elected not to seek an adjudication of ownership rights pursuant to subsection 8(b)."
Some incentive, in addition to the natural desire to avoid expensive litigation, is desirable; however,
that incentive should not take the form of denying either the special riparian easement or the
confirmation of upland title to a challenging landowner. Such a denial would create adjacent parcels
with different (and unapparent) waterside boundaries and different appurtenant rights. While the
triggering litigation would appear of record, the impact on property rights would not be express,
nor would MRTA cure the different rights. Accordingly, future title examiners, long after the 30year MRTA period runs, would have to examine an obscure (and otherwise irrelevant) segment
of the record to discover any subsection 8 litigation.
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mitted uses of the special ripariain easement, subject to regulatory restrictions,
include, but are not limited to the right of a developer to erect pilings to
support a marina, and the right of agricultural riparian owners to run a fence
into the water a sufficient distance to prevent livestock from migrating onto
neighboring lands.
(j) "Swamp lands" means those lands subject to intermittent flooding; or
over which water routinely stands, when such water has an average depth during
the course of the year of less than feet over a horizontal distance of _
feet;
or on which are growing cypress and other exposed vegetative matter of a type
2

inconsistent with regular navigation.

111

(2) Public Trust Rights Reaffirmed. It is hereby reaffirmed that the citizens
of the State of Florida shall have public trust rights in the navigable waters of
this state. The state and its political subdivisions shall have the governmental
authority and police power to regulate the uses to which lands and waters
impressed with public trust rights may be put. Such authority includes, but is
not limited to, the power to prohibit mining of the submerged beds beneath
the waters, to restrict pollution sources, to regulate boating, fishing and the
withdrawal of water, and any other private use that could substantially impair
or interfere with the public's exercise of its public trust rights to use the waters.
The rights of the public to use navigable waters pursuant to the public trust
doctrine shall be liberally construed.
(3) Designation of Navigable Waters and Ordinary High Water Line. The
department shall designate all waterbodies, or portions thereof, within the state
which it deems to be navigable, and as to each shall designate the ordinary
2
high water line. '

(a) The standard to be used by the department in determining whether
waterbodies, or portions thereof, are to be designated as navigable under this

250. This definition responds to the state's expansive claims that the swamp on either side of
the Peace River was below the navigable waterline. Trustees' Trial Brief, supra note 206. This
analysis would subject much of Florida, sold as swamp and overflowed lands, to sovereignty lands
claims. By disregarding past changes in the OHWL, subsection (1)(d) will limit the problem; however,
only an express exclusion of swampland can truly correct it. Like OHWL, the term "swamp" is
confusing. The state land agents estimated that two-thirds of Florida was "Swamp and Overflowed."
Set supra text accompanying notes 38-42. This definition only becomes relevant should someone
challenge DNR's OHWL determination.
251. This provision is designed to encourage the creation of a comprehensive list of sovereignty
lands. Such a list would solve the problems inherent in determining navigability vel non. Given
DNR's inherent "vested interest" and its past failure to conduct such a survey when directed by
statute, perhaps a separate agency should conduct the surveys and make navigability determinations.

DNR's delay may be explicable, in large part, by a lack of appropriations to do the job. See infa
note 255. Yet, it must be noted that procrastination in conducting the surveys was consistent with
DNR's underlying interests. No administrative agency wants to tie its own hands, and DNR benefits
more directly than most by the indeterminacy generated. If the agency has not previously made
a sovereignty lands determination, when a permit is requested, it must issue a ruling. Then it can
use the indeterminacy to extort payments. It can also claim a much higher OHWL (hence more
state-owned land and revenue) on a case-by-case, non-litigated basis than it could if a global
determination were announced. This bill should get more action than past legislation, because it
eliminates some of the incentive to procrastinate.
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subsection shall be whether the waters, in their current ordinary state, are
navigable as determined under the Federal Title Test of Navigability.25"
(b) In determining the ordinary high water line, swamp lands shall be
deemed to be above the ordinary high water line.
(c) The designations shall be prepared separately for each county, and shall
include:
(i) a list identifying each designated waterbody by name and specifying
the portions thereof so designated;
(ii) a surveyor's description of the ordinary high water line for each
water body designated navigable; and
(iii) a county map on which the designated waterbodies are clearly de53
picted.

(d) The lists identifying the waterbodies deemed navigable by the department shall be submitted to the Board of Trustees within two years after the
14
effective date of this act.2

(e) The maps and descriptions shall be submitted to the Board of Trustees
as and when completed and in all cases within four years after the effective
25
date of this act.

5

(4) Board of Trustees' Approval. The Board of Trustees shall review and
252. The authors debated whether this provision would trigger a taking, and whether the risk
that it would be construed as a taking would outweigh the benefits of avoiding a need to determine
historic OHWLs. The suggested solution permits DNR to use this standard for designation purposes,
but in the event of challenge under subsection 8, this solution mandates the court utilize a historic
navigability standard. This solution should be constitutional given the reverse MRTA provision.
253. Defining in legislation the extent of state ownership serves two primary goals. The first
is to publish a readily ascertainable boundary line not subject to DNR redefinition or waffling.
The second goal is to define the boundary line in conformity with common notions of the extent
of state ownership.
A readily ascertainable boundary line avoids costly litigation to determine some past or hypothetical state, and creates a determinate, surveyed line of demarcation. Again, the authors considered using the "dynamic boundary line where land meets water" as the line of demarcation.
See supra note 248. However, while creating a wonderfully discernible line, this definition could
cause problems during flood stages, when water rises onto clearly private land. This definition also
potentially yields undesired results for those swamp and lowlands adjacent to a navigable waterbody.
The dynamic boundary line could have treated a great deal of swamp and overflowed lands as
sovereignty lands. The authors returned to a more traditional definition of OHWL with some minor
modifications. First, we adopted the common law definition of OHWL as set forth in Tilden v.
Smith, 94 Fla. 502, 512-13, 113 So. 708, 712 (1927). This definition would assume no prior
avulsive changes, and that tide is where the OHWL falls today, thus eliminating any need to
adjust for past avulsive changes. This approach treats future avulsive changes as they were treated
at common law, being deemed not to change the line of demarcation. More careful recording of
waterlevels today than in the 1840's facilitates future determinations of the causes of change and
their respective impacts. While the boundary line established is not as easily pointed out as the
dynamic waterline, it is readily determinable. Perhaps more importantly, it comports with popular

notions of the extent of public ownership.
254. The timetables for presenting the lists and the other materials were bifurcated because
approval of the designation lists by the Trustees will immediately clear title to most "dubious"
waterbodies - small ponds, minor streams and sloughs.
255. A substantial legislative appropriation is necessary for DNR to accomplish this undertaking
within the specified time limits.
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either approve or modify the navigability designations and ordinary high water
line determinations within 180 days after receipt thereof from the department.
The designation list, as finally approved by the Board of Trustees, shall be
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the respective county at least
once each week for six consecutive weeks. Each such publication shall also
include notice of the location at which the ordinary high water line descriptions
and maps are available for public inspection, notice of the right to contest the
designations, instructions as to the method of filing claims under subsection
(8)(a), and information concerning the special riparian easement.
The formal approval of such navigability designations and ordinary high
water line determinations made pursuant to this subsection shall constitute the
Board of Trustees' official determination that the confirmation of title to lands
pursuant to this act-regardless of the prior status of such lands-is in the
public interest.2 -"
(5) Failure to Object or File Notice. If no objection under subsection (8)(a)
is filed prior to the perfection date:
(a) The lists, maps and descriptions shall become final and shall constitute
a conclusive determination of navigability and of the ordinary high water line.
Any lands not appearing on the designation lists or maps on the perfection
date shall be conclusively deemed not to have contained any navigable waters
on March 3, 1845. The lists, maps, descriptions and proof of publication shall
be filed in the public records of the county containing the lands surveyed and
in the offices of the department; and
(b) The failure to file a notice of claim or for adjudication of navigability
or determination of ordinary high water line under subsections (8) or (9) shall
constitute a grant to the state of all right, title and interest in those lands
underlying navigable waters, to the extent delineated in the maps and descriptions approved pursuant to subsection (4), which are held or claimed by any
person failing to so file. Such grant shall forever bar a claim of ownership
interest in lands lying below the ordinary high water line, other than riparian
2 7
rights and the special riparian easement.. 1

256. While redundant with the formal legislative determination of "public interest," this section
was added to respond to the uncertainty concerning which governmental branch is required to
decide under art. X, S 11 of the Florida Constitution. See supra text accompanying notes 233-35.
257. This is the "reverse MRTA" provision. The riparian rights preserved above would cause
future non-avulsive changes to affect the boundary between public and private ownership under
common law rules. While it appears incongruous to "fix" past changes in the OHWL at a current
level while expressly permitting future changes to affect the boundary between owners, this is
necessary and even desirable. Future changes must be permitted to affect the line of demarcation
to assure owners continued access to the waters. If the line were absolutely fixed, a subsequent
drop in the waterlevels, or change in course, regardless of its cause, would deprive the owner of
access to the waters. Similarly, a natural increase in the waterlevels would permit private encroachments on navigable waters.
This proposed legislation only clarifies present ownership and lines of demarcation. Future
changes would be governed by existing rules of avulsion, reliction, and accretion. The difference
will be in the existence of a valid and discernible starting point and the modern ability to determine
the extent and cause of subsequent changes in water levels with greater accuracy.
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(6) Grant of Special Riparian Easement.
(a) The legislature recognizes that many persons have in good faith purchased and paid taxes on lands beneath navigable waters which were purportedly
conveyed into private ownership by the state, the United States or a prior
sovereign many years ago without reservation or other record notice of the
state's claim to sovereignty lands. The legislature recognizes that it is difficult,
if not impossible, to determine the true extent of waterbodies as they existed
on March 3, 1845, whether such waterbodies were navigable on that date, and
whether previously submerged lands were exposed naturally or avulsively. The
legislature further recognizes that the costs of litigating the ownership rights in
such lands are burdensome to the state and prohibitive to many claimants,
particularly since the submerged lands to which the state claims sovereignty
title are of limited value for private use due to governmental land use controls,
environmental regulations, and restrictions imposed by the common law public
trust doctrine. Accordingly, in consideration of the relinquishment of potential
claims and title to the lands presently lying beneath navigable waters, there is
hereby granted to qualifying riparian landowners and their successors in interest,
in perpetuity, (i) a special riparian easement2z 1s in the lands designated and
approved under subsections (3) and (4) and (ii) any right, title or interest in
formerly submerged lands now lying above the ordinary high water line as
approved under subsection (4), which might be owned by the state, but to
which a qualifying riparian landowner has record title. The legislature specifically finds and declares these grants to be in the public interest21"

(b) No fee in excess of ten dollars shall be imposed by the state or its
agencies for the enjoyment of the special riparian easement by the riparian
owner, his successors or assigns. Nothing herein shall be construed to confer
a special riparian easement in any meandered waters.
(7) Sovereignty Lands Deeds. Within the period set forth for filing claims
in subsection (8), a qualifying riparian landowner may execute and deliver a
sovereignty lands deed to the Board of Trustees. The Board of Trustees is
obligated to accept and record all deeds so granted and shall be required to
furnish the grantor with a valuation and other data needed to claim the conveyance as a charitable contribution for federal income tax purposes. 24
(8) Challenge to Navigability Determination. Any person or persons who
claim an ownership interest in lands to which the state would acquire title under
subsection (5) may contest the determination of navigability or allege a prior
vesting of title by filing a notice of claim with the Board of Trustees within

258. The special riparian easement prevents perceived administrative abuses and overcharges
for the privilege of making perfectly reasonable and often societally desirable use of the periphery
of the waterways. The special riparian easement is expressly subject to state regulatory controls.

259. This section contains both the express grant language necessary to confirm title in riparian
deedholders and the public interest finding required by article X, section 11 of the Florida Con-

stitution.
260. This section also encourages voluntary relinquishment of claims to allegedly navigable
waterways. As navigability and the extent of sovereignty lands are disputed, such a conveyance

has value. Given the nature of the uncertainty, any deed given should resemble a quitclaim deed.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol38/iss3/2

56

Jacobs and Fields: Sovereignty Lands in Florida: Lost in a Swamp of Ambiguity
1986]

SOVEREIGNTY LANDS IN FLORIDA

one year after the date of the last publication in the county made pursuant to
subsection (4). The notice of claim shall state:
(i) the name(s) of the person(s) claiming the ownership interest;
(ii) the legal description of riparian properties owned and the lands specifically claimed;
(iii) the nature of the ownership interest claimed; and
(iv) the legal basis of the claim.
(a) Upon receiving a notice of claim, the Board of Trustees shall examine
the claim and determine whether the ownership interest asserted by the claimant
should be confirmed or rejected in whole or in part. The Board of Trustees
shall consider, inter alia, the following criteria in evaluating claims:
(i) whether the claimant has apparent record title based on a purported
and express conveyance from the United States or a foreign sovereign prior to
2 ,1
statehood; '

(ii) whether and to what extent title may have been confirmed in the
claimant by the operation of law; and
(iii) whether ad valorem taxes have been assessed and paid on the land.
Within 120 days after receiving the notice of claim, the Board of Trustees shall
notify the claimant, in writing under seal, 2 62 of its decision to confirm or reject
the claim in whole or in part, and shall advise the claimant of the right to
seek an adjudication of ownership rights as provided in subsection 8(b).
(b) Any person who files a notice of claim pursuant to subsection (8) and
whose claim is rejected in whole or in part by the Board of Trustees may file
suit in the circuit court of the county in which the lands are located to obtain
an adjudication of ownership rights. Such action must be filed within one year
after the date on which the Board of Trustees issued notice to the claimant of
its decision pursuant to subsection (8)(a), or shall be forever barred. In suits
filed pursuant to this subsection, the claimant shall have the burden of proving
that meandered waters are non-navigable, and the state shall have the burden
of proving that unmeandered waters are navigable. The standard of navigability
used, unless otherwise stipulated by the parties, shall be the federal standard
adopted for determinations of title applied to the waterbody as it is found to
have existed on March 3, 1845. The court may, in its discretion, award attorney's fees to the prevailing party if it finds that the factual or legal grounds
on which the losing party contested the claim were without substantial merit.
(c) No filing of a claim under this subsection shall prejudice a riparian
landowner's rights to voluntarily convey property to the state pursuant to subsection (7) or to receive the special riparian easement and confirmation of title
to avulsively exposed lands in accord with subsection (6), or otherwise affect
his ability to become a qualifying riparian landowner.
(9) Objections as to Determination of Ordinary High Water Line. Any
riparian owner who disagrees with the determination of the ordinary high water

261. In either case, title to the submerged lands passed absolutely to the grantee.
262. This determination will affect title and should thus meet the requisites for filing in the
public records of the respective counties.
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line as it affects his property may file with the circuit court of the county in
which the lands are located for an independent determination of the ordinary
high water line.
(a) The court may on its own motion, and shall on motion of a party,
appoint an unbiased surveyor to independently survey the ordinary high water
line as it exists on the date of survey. Costs of such a survey may be assessed
against the non-prevailing party. The report of an independent surveyor shall
be persuasive evidence of the ordinary high water line.
(b) The court, unless an independent survey is conducted, may adopt the
lower of the line described in the department's survey or the line of demarcation
between land and water as is shown on the most recent United States aerial
survey of the land in question.
(c) The private claimant may choose to claim that the historic ordinary
high water line, as adjusted for artificial and avulsive changes, is the true
boundary. If the private claimant so chooses and upon satisfactory proof of
such boundary line, this method of determination shall be adopted by the court2'
(d) Upon judicial determination, the ordinary high water line as determined
shall be reduced to a legal description and recorded in the public records of
the county in which the land lies and in the offices of the department. Such
legal description shall supersede the legal description promulgated under subsection (4) for all purposes under this section.
(e) No filing of a claim under this subsection shall prejudice a riparian
landowner's rights to convey property voluntarily to the state pursuant to subsection (7) or to receive the special riparian easement and confirmation of title
to avulsively exposed lands in accord with subsection (6), or otherwise affect
his ability to become a qualifying riparian landowner.
(10) Effect on State Police and Regulatory Powers. Nothing herein shall
be construed to exempt either the unsubmerged fee interest or riparian rights
held by the riparian owner or the special riparian easement granted herein from
the operation of the state's police and regulatory powers.
(11) Claims Against Landowners. Except as provided in this subsection,
qualifying riparian landowners shall not be subject to claims or suits by the
state, or by any party claiming through the state, to recover any damages,
assess ally fees, or impose any penalties for past uses of unmeandered sovereignty lands by the qualifying riparian landowners or their predecessors in
interest. Any private parties holding such claims shall have a period of one
year from the date of enactment to file their claim in the circuit court of the
county in which the lands lie. All claims not filed within that period shall be
barred. The legislature hereby finds and acknowledges that prior to the publication of navigability designations under subsection (4), qualifying riparian
landowners may have justifiably relied on the public records and the presumption of non-navigability in exercising ownership rights with respect to sub263. The private landowner must have the option of selecting the common law determination
to avoid constitutional taking claims. See supra note 251. This option only becomes relevant in those
few situations where someone willing to bear the expense could show that the historic OHWL was
lower than the existing OHWL.
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merged lands and the adjoining uplands; therefore, it would be inequitable and
contrary to the public interest for the state to seek damages, to assess fees, or
to impose penalties of any kind against qualifying riparian landowners for conduct which preceded the first official determination that the waters, though
unmeandered, are navigable. This subsection shall not be construed to limit
claims against or the defenses of any person who is not a qualifying riparian
landowner or predecessor thereof as of the date when navigability designations
are published pursuant to subsection (4).
(12) Admission of Non-navigability. A determination by the Board of Trustees not to designate a waterbody or portion thereof as navigable or not to
contest a notice of claim made pursuant to subsection (8), shall constitute an
admission, forever binding on the state, its agencies and political subdivisions,
that the lands underlying such waterbody or portion thereof are neither navigable nor owned by the state as sovereignty lands.
(13) Ad Valorem Taxes. No person shall be assessed or required to pay ad
valorem taxes on any of the lands to which the state has title or is granted
title under subsections (5) or (7). All such lands shall be removed from the
county tax rolls as of the perfection date.
(14) Nonseverability of Section. It is the intent of the legislature that the
provisions of this section be deemed interdependent and nonseverable. It is also
the intent of the legislature that the time periods prescribed herein not be
extended, as continued uncertainty as to the ownership of the lands in question
is contrary to the public interest.
Section 2. This act shall take effect upon becoming a law.
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